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Other Constituency Statutes
RichardB. Tyler'
I. INTRODUCTION
The takeover phenomenon of the 1980s resulted in a massive

"releveraging" of American industry.' In addition to the profound impact on

the companies directly involved and those that undertook drastic measures to
avert being taken over, this "releveraging" has markedly affected groups
outside the corporations involved, such as employees, suppliers, customers,
and communities.2 To meet the debt-service obligations flowing from
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. B.S., 1954,
U.S. Military Academy; M.Sc.E., 1960, Purdue University; J.D. 1967, University of
Minnesota School of Law.
I wish to thank David Gallego, Robert Lay, Robin Lundstrum and Helen Vanek
for their research assistance on this project, and my colleagues, William Fisch, David
Fischer, Robert Lawless, and Al Neely for their comments on an earlier draft. Any
errors that follow are solely my responsibility.
1. Clifford L. Whitehill, The American Law Institute Tentatively Approves Part
VI of its Corporate Governance Project, in NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PROJECT IN MID-PASSAGE: WHAT WILL IT MEAN To You? 113, 120-22 (1991)
(hereinafter "Whitehill"); Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a FederalCorporation
Law?, 57 BRoOK. L. REV. 55, 62 n.34 (1991); Deborah A. DeMott, Directors'Duties
in ManagementBuyouts and LeveragedRecapitalizations,49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517
& n.4 (1988). The "releveraging" resulted from the use of non-investment grade
("junk") bonds and other debt and debt-like instruments to finance hostile takeovers in
leveraged buy-outs ("LBOs"), as well as the use by companies, which feared that they
might be targets of hostile takeovers, of similar devices to eliminate public shareholders in management buy-outs ("MBOs")-the "going private" phenomenon. For a good
illustration, as well as a good read, see BRIAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR,
BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (1990).
To be sure, a fair amount of scholarly opinion defended the high levels of debt
as a mechanism to compel management to work harder in order to service the debt.
See, Karmel, supra, at 63 n.37.
2. Whitehill, supra note 1 at 123-24; James Lyons, ConflictingInterests,FORBES,
Mar. 30, 1992, at 48; Jonathon R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital
Investments,and the Legal TreatmentofFundamentalCorporateChanges, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 173 (arguing that stakeholders are not, in fact, harmed by hostile takeovers, and

that they are capable of protecting themselves contractually). Contra, John C.Coffee,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the CorporateWeb, 85 MICH. L. REv.
1 (1986). See also Deals and Misdeals: A Sampling of M&A Hits and Strikeouts in
the 1980s, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, March/April 1990, at 100 (a review of the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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leveraged buy-outs, many of which were financed with high-risk,
noninvestment grade ("junk") bonds, companies "restructured"; employees lost
their jobs,3 older facilities were closed to the detriment of communities
dependent on them,4 existing bondholders found their claims downgraded or
felt their security jeopardized,5 and existing suppliers and customers found
their relationships disrupted, if not dismantled entirely." Existing federal
law7 sought to provide some protection for shareholders faced with deciding
whether to tender, but nothing spoke directly to the concerns of these other

results of a decade's combinations).
3. Annie B. Fisher, Employees Left Holdingthe Bag, FORTUNE, May 20, 1991,
at 83; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State
NonshareholderConstituencyStatutes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 45, 45 & n.4 (1991). See
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, InterpretingNonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 971, 1003 nn.136 & 137 (1993). Perhaps an even more threatening
development has been the extent to which acquirors have used employee pension funds
to finance takeovers, and the resulting risk to retirees, both current and future. See,
e.g., Christi Harlan, LTV's PensionLiabilitiesAren't Favored,Judge Says, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 16, 1991, at A3 (reporting that a federal judge had ruled that LTV's
underfunded pension plan should not be accorded preferred status in a bankruptcy
proceeding following a merger that involved assuming a substantial amount of debt,
as well as using "excess" reserves in the pension fund). See also Daniel Keating,
PensionInsurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 65; Jonathon
M. Moses & Milo Geyelin, R.JR to Pay $72.5 Million to Settle Suit, WALL ST. J., Feb.
26, 1992, at B8 (reporting RJR's agreement to settle a class-action suit brought by
former shareholders and employee stock-option holders who charged that the company
failed to disclose takeover talks in the months preceding its LBO).
4. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1004 & n.141; Joseph William Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property,40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 633-63 (1988). See also Arthur
S. Hayes, CompaniesAre Finding it Harder to Move Out of Town, WALL ST. J.,
March 1, 1993, at B6, col. 1, mentioning, inter alia, a suit brought by the city of
Ypsilanti against General Motors to block its planned closure of the Willow Run
facility after the town had granted GM tax abatements in 1980. Although a trial court
found for Ypsilanti, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. See Ypsilanti v. General
Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
5. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
In fact, the LBO phenomenon resulted in a massive shift of wealth from
bondholders to shareholders. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 206-09 (1988); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE: CASES & MATERIALS 408-409 (2d ed. 1989) (recounting the
downgrading of RJR Nabisco, Inc.'s outstanding bonds after its LBO).
6. Macey, supra note 2, at 173-174.
7. Williams Act, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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groups; their concerns remained the focus of state law, such as statutory and
common corporate law and the law of contract and fraudulent conveyance.
Unfortunately, neither state corporation laws nor the common law rules
applicable to corporations addressed these issues. Most statutes simply said
that the business and affairs of the corporation would be managed by, or under
the direction of, a board of directors8 without specifying how the directors
were to carry out their functions. This omission was left to common law.9
The traditional obligations of directors, the duty of care" and the duty of
loyalty," supplemented by the business judgment rule, 2 run to the
corporationand apply to all of the actions of the directors, including their
response to takeover bids. Thus, in most jurisdictions, it was not clear that,

in deciding how to respond to a takeover proposal, a board could consider the
potential impact on constituencies outside the corporation. Cheffv. Mathes 3
did permit a board to justify a decision to buy out the interest of an unwanted

8. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.310
(1988) ("property and business"); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 35 (1979)
[hereinafter "MBCA"]; REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.01(B)
(1984) [hereinafter "RMBCA"].
9. Some statutes, such as MBCA § 35 and RMBCA § 8.30, and statutes patterned
after them (e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Bums 1989), based on § 8.30 of
RMBCA) did specify directors' duties, but these specifications were generally
patterned on the rules that evolved in the cases.
10. Usually phrased as the duty to act with that degree of care that would be
exercised by a reasonable prudent person in a similar situation under similar
circumstances. See, e.g., Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 223 S.W. 423, 426 (Mo.
1920); MBCA § 35. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4, at 123
(1986); PHILIP G.LOUIS, JR. & FRANK C.BROWN, 25 MISSOURI PRACTICE: BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 24.3 (1993).
11. The duty of loyalty essentially addresses conflict of interest situations:
directors owe their highest degree of loyalty to the corporation; they must not place
themselves, or allow themselves to be placed, in a position in which their personal
interests conflict with that of the corporation. See generally Ramacciotti v. Joe
Simpkins, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. 1968); Binz v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co.,
378 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); CLARK, supra note 10, § 4.1 at 141; Louis &
BROWN, supra note 10, § 24.4.
12. The business judgment rule says that when a matter is committed to the
discretion of the board of directors, and the board, in good faith, exercises a business
judgment, a court will not examine the merits of the decision, or second-guess the
board. CLARK, supranote 10, § 3.4 at 123; Louis & BROWN, supra note 10, § 24.9.
See generally Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Broski v. Jones, 614
S.W.2d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
13. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

shareholder because of concern for the interests of employees and the
company's customers and suppliers, but that was a relatively unusual case. 4
Then, in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Smith v. Van
Gorkom s and imposed personal liability on a board of directors that had
acceded too readily to a friendly merger proposal originally initiated by Van
Gorkom, the autocratic chief executive officer of the company being acquired.
The Delaware court refused to give the directors the benefit of the business
judgment rule because, it held, their judgment was not informed, 6 The court
imposed liability on the directors for the difference between the merger price
and a "fair" price, and remanded for a determination of that amount; although
it was ultimately settled; without an evidentiary hearing, for $23.5 million, 7

14. Other cases that appear to recognize the idea that corporations have
responsibilities to groups in addition to shareholders include, e.g., Universal Leaf
Tobacco Co. Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 554 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1977); Herald CO. v.
Seawall, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp.

741 (D. Del. 1973); Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (I11.App. Ct. 1968). See generally Macey,
supra note 2, at 177-78.
Some states, like Delaware and Missouri, did elaborate on director's standards of
behavior in their indemnification statutes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1991); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 351.355 (Supp. 1993). These provisions specify the circumstances under
which officers and directors may be indemnified for claims brought against them as
a result of their performance as directors and officers, and so prescribe standards of

behavior in a back-handed fashion. But, essentially, these only require that the
individual seeking indemnification have acted in good faith, and in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation,
if the action is brought by a third party. If the action is brought by or in the right of
the corporation (e.g., a shareholder's derivative action), there is the added proviso that
no indemnification may be made with regard to any claim as to which the person has
been adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty
to the corporation, unless the court before which the action was brought determines
that, notwithstanding the judgment of liability, it is fair and reasonable to indemnify
that person.
15. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
16. The board, all of whom had served on the target's board for several years and
were familiar with the company's unsuccessful efforts to find a merger partner or
otherwise extricate itself from a capital squeeze situation, had approved the proposed
merger, which was not an arm's length transaction, on the basis of a two-hour meeting
during which they heard a presentation from the CEO (who, recall, had instigated the
transaction and suggested the price), but did not see the actual documents, or attempt
to verify the adequacy of the price, "shop" the company, or take other action to give
the appearance of independent bargaining.
17. Apparently, $10 million was covered by insurance, $10 million paid by the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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it created a certain amount of consternation in boardrooms across the
country. 8 It also allegedly contributed to a marked increase in the premiums
for director's and officer's liability policies ("D&O policies"). 19 Managements became more interested in having a statutory basis to permit them to
consider a broadened range of factors, particularly when responding to
takeover proposals, and, with a little prompting from the Delaware Court in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,20 "other constituency"
statutes came into being. Such statutes arguably reflect a public policy of
encouraging managers to consider the effects on groups in addition to
shareholders in determining whether or not a particular action is in the best
interests of the corporation. Of course, directors could only raise the
argument that they were acting in the interests of some other constituency if
the minutes of their deliberations reflected that such considerations actually
were taken during the board's discussion of the proposed actiori, but that
should pose no problem for boards of directors acting under the advice of
experienced counsel.2' Further urgency was provided as disappointed

corporate purchaser or an affiliate, and the directors paid the rest. See LARRY D.
SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER JR., CORPORATIONS:

CASES, MATERIALS

AND

PROBLEMS 206 (3d ed. 1991).
18. See Laurie Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept 8, 1986, at 56;
Mauro, Liability in the Boardroom, NATION'S Bus., May 1986, at 45-46. One

response to this concern, now adopted in some 40 states, was to secure legislation
permitting corporations to adopt provisions in their articles of incorporation limiting
or eliminating directors' liability. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(c) (West 1990);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Bums

1989); RMBCA § 8.30(d). That movement is beyond the scope of this Article.
19. SODERQUIST & SOMMER, supra note 17, at 207 n.20.
Shortly after Van Gorkom, a director of the leading directors' liability insurer at
Lloyd's of London said, "Any buyer who thinks the cost of his insurance will only
double is a dreamer." Newport, ProtectingDirectorsSuddenly Gets Costly, FORTUNE,
Mar. 18, 1985, at 61. Two years after Van Gorkom, Korn/Ferry International
estimated that the premiums for directors' liability insurance "went up more than 900
percent in just two years." Powell, Is It Safe to Go Back in the Boardroom?,
NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1987, at 45,46.
See also Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of
Care Standard in Corporate Governance,75 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1989), reporting that,
in spite of all the attention the case received in the business community, it did not

affect the market value of Delaware corporations. They also note that D&O insurance
premiums increased more than twelvefold in the year the Van Gorkom decision was

rendered, and that the common stock of firms writing D&O insurance rose significantly. Id.at 73. The authors suggest that insurers were able to increase premiums
beyond the actuarial fair amount. Id. at 75.
20. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).

21. That is not to suggest that counsel would falsify minutes of meetings, but only
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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shareholders began bringing suits against directors who successfully resisted
merger proposals. 2
Of course, the push for antitakeover legislation was already well
established-the earliest ("first generation") statutes dated from the late
1960s.'
When these were struck down in Edgar v. Mite Corp.,4 the
proponents of this legislation went back to the drawing board and continued
tinkering with state laws. It was natural to think of adding consideration of
other constituencies to the arsenal of weapons being forged to resist takeovers.
Apparently permission for directors to consider other constituencies in the
context of mergers and business combinations first appeared in the articles of
incorporation of Control Data Corporation in 1978.25 For once, the interests
of management began to coincide with those of organized labor, which had
become concerned at the job losses resulting from LBOs. This coalition began
to lobby state legislatures for legislation permitting or requiring directors to
take the interests of other constituencies into account in deciding how to
respond to takeover proposals.26 Large bondholders-institutional lend-

to recognize that experienced counsel, being aware of the possibilities, would ensure
that such considerations were actually raised, and reflected in the minutes of the
board's deliberations. Then, the argument can be raised that particular action was
taken in consideration of these other groups. Less experienced counsel might not take
such precautions.
22. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
23. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests,
Effects, andPoliticalCompetency,62 CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977); Mark A. Sargent,
On the Validity of State TakeoverRegulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell,
42 OHIo ST. L.J. 689 (1981); Diane S. Wilner & Craig A. Landy, The Tender Trap:
State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality,45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1976).

24. 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating the Illinois first generation statute). Lower
courts promptly relied on Edgar in striking similar statutes. See National City Lines,
Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (invalidating Missouri's first
generation statute).

25. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 121, 149 (1991); A.A. Sommer, Whom Should the CorporationServe? The

Berle-DoddDebate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 39 (1991).
26. See John C. Coffee Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State
Competition and the New Trend TowardDe Facto Minimum Standards, 8 CARDozo
L. REV. 759, 770 & n.28 (1987) (concluding that in New York, labor actively
supported such legislation); Kenneth B. Davis Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile
Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 491, 493-497 (discussing
Wisconsin antitakeover legislation); Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and
Boards ofDirectors,21 STETSON L. REv. 197, 220 (1991) (noting that the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO co-sponsored the 1990 amendments to
Pennsylvania's other constituency statute). Minow also notes that, by October 17,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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ers-who saw the value of their senior bonds degraded by the insertion of
large amounts of junior debt into the capital structures of their debtor
corporations also began to demand some sort of protection, and other
constituency statutes seemed like a possible avenue."
Several state legislatures responded by adopting other constituency
statutes, permitting 8 or requiring29 directors to consider the impact of a

1990, nearly one-third of Pennsylvania's publicly traded companies had opted out of
at least some provisions of the bill; indeed, she says that over 61% of the Fortune 500
companies incorporated in Pennsylvania had opted out, as had over 56% of those
included in the Standard & Poor 500. Id. See also John C. Coffee Jr., The Uncertain
Casefor Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bust-ups,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 437 & n.8. But see Roberta Romano, The PoliticalEconomy
of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 134-38 (1987) (report of her study of the

adoption of antitakeover measures in Connecticut, in which she concluded that there
was no broad-based coalition of stakeholders; rather, the legislation was special interest
legislation enacted at the behest of the incumbent managers of certain powerful
corporations).
27. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); James J. Hanks Jr., Playingwith Fire: NonshareholderConstituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REv. 97, 116 (1991) (noting that many other

constituencies-like creditors-may be protected by fraudulent conveyance statutes,
as well as by contract, and noting that many lenders now include in loan documents
provisions to deal with "event risks"); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of
the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
CorporateFiduciaryDuties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 40 & n.35 (1991); McDaniel,

supra note 25, at 125-26.
28. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-

2-202(b)(5) (1990); HAw. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 301602 (Supp. 1993); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 8/85 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d),(f),(g) (Bums 1989); IOWA CODE § 491.101B (1993); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); LA.' REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 12:92(G)(2) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp.
1993); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B § 65 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A .251(5) (West Supp. 1994); MaSS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1993);
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347(4) (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2055(1)(c) (Supp.
1990); N.J. STAT. ANN § 14A:6-1(2), -14(4) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 53-11-35(D) (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT

§ 60.357(5) (1993); PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1711-1712, 1715-1717, 1721 (1993); R.I.
GEN. LAWs § 7-5.2-8 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992); WYO.
STAT. § 17-16-830(e) (1977).
See Appendix, 21 STETSON L. REv. 279 (1991), for the texts of the statutes

existing as of 1991.
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1993).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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takeover on groups in addition to the shareholders; some specified 3particular
groups,3 whereas others phrased the permission more generally.

Some

statutes took the approach of including such provisions in sections specifying

the standards of directors' behavior in general;32 most are applicable to
directors' obligations in contexts other than takeovers.33 Some statutes limit
this consideration to responding to takeovers.34

Missouri's approach was initially limited to the takeover context. 35 In
1989, however, the scope was expanded to apply to all exercises of business

judgment. 36 To date, there has been no judicial interpretation of this statute
or any of the other similar statutes, and so the question remains whether these
statutes have any significance at all. More generally, how should courts37 treat
these sorts of statutes, which exist now in at least twenty-eight states?

30. E.g., id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.083(3) (West 1993); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.347 (Supp. 1993).
31. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1993).
32. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993).
33. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 986 n. 83, reports that only Connecticut, Iowa,
Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee limit their nonshareholder
constituency statutes' effect to corporate acquisitions. As indicated in notes 34 & 35,
infra, the Missouri provision has been broadened to include any exercise of business
judgment.
34. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (as originally adopted in 1986) (amended
1989). This is also the approach taken by the American Law Institute. See ALl
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft, March

31, 1992).
35. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (1986) read:
1. In exercising its business judgment concerning any acquisition proposal,
as defined in subsection 2 of this section, the board of directors of the
corporation may consider the following factors among others:
(4) Social, legal and economic effects on employees, suppliers,
customers and others having similar relationships with the corporation, and
the communities in which the corporation conducts its businesses;
3.
Nothing in this section shall require any director or corporation to
respond to any particular acquisition proposal.
36. In 1989, Subsection 3 was modified to read:

3.

Nothing in this section shall require any director or corporation to

respond to any particular acquisition proposal nor preclude directors, in
exercising their business judgment in other contexts, from considering
factors such as those enumerated in subsection 1 of this section.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347.3 (Supp. 1993). However, the title to this section remains,
"Acquisition proposals, board may make recommendation."
37. See Appendix, 21 STETSON L. REV. 279 (1991).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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This Article will use the Missouri experience as a point of departure to
consider what the legal effect of "other constituency" statutes might be.
Recognizing that "other constituency" statutes were adopted along with other
statutes clearly aimed at deterring unwanted takeovers, those other statutes will
also be discussed. First, the Missouri law relating to corporate governance
prior to the enactment of the package of Missouri legislation that includes the
other constituency statute will be examined, including the legislative history
of these statutes and the sources from which they seem to have been drawn.
Next, this Article will consider whether, and to what extent, the changing
nature of the corporate shareholder population should affect the interpretation
of such statutes. This will require some digression into the "nexus of
contracts" approach to corporate theory and some counter-arguments to this
approach. The effect of these statutes on different classes of corporations-"close" to public-is then considered. The next area of inquiry treats
some of the problems with these statutes: their permissive nature and their
ambiguity. A distinction may be taken between "structural" and "operational"
decisions, but both pose conflict of interest problems for directors. This raises
questions as to the applicability of the business judgment rule and, hence, the
other constituency statutes. Following that, this Article considers which
constituencies merit consideration, and then looks to the various
contexts-ranging from hostile takeover bids to routine business decisions-in
which these statutes might come into play.
-Returning to a supposed motive for adoption of these statutes, concern
about imposing Draconian liability on boards of directors, this Article analyzes

the possible effect of these statutes on director liability. This leads into a brief
consideration of some possible rationales for imposing liability on directors,
their interaction with statutes permitting corporations to indemnify officers and
directors, and some possible alternative remedies. A consideration of the sorts
of liabilities for which indemnification might be considered, and others for
which it would not be appropriate, follows, leading to the question of how
directors' liability might be limited, if that is desired. Finally, this Article
concludes by noting that these statutes are so flawed that they should be
repealed and suggests some other approaches to realigning the system of
corporate governance.
II. PRIOR MIssouRI LAW
Historically, Missouri statutes did not specify the standards of behavior
expected of directors, at least not directly. Rather, the statute provided that
the "property and business" of the corporation were to be "controlled and
managed" by a board of directors. 8 The only express liability section in the

38. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.310 (1986).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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statute imposed personal liability on directors who knowingly declared and
paid a dividend other than as provided in the dividend statutes.3 9
The statutory provision for indemnification of directors,4" which was
similar to that of Delaware,' provided some guidance for directors. With
regard to suits brought by outsiders against a person because of serving as a
director, the statute permits indemnification if the director acted in good faith
and in a manner the director reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to,
the best interests of the corporation-essentially a "good faith, reasonable
belief' standard. When an action was brought by or on behalf of the
corporation, a director could be indemnified according to the same standard,
with the added proviso that no indemnification could be paid with respect to
any claim for which the director was adjudged liable for negligence or
misconduct unless the court determined that, in spite of the negligence or
misconduct the director was fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification.
This adds some element of care, or at least non-negligent behavior, to the
good faith, reasonable belief standard in those cases in which suit is brought
by or on behalf of the corporation. Also, the statute authorizes the corporation
to purchase insurance on behalf of its directors; 42 in that context, the
insurance carriers may impose certain standards on directors' behavior.
However, the statute also says that it is not exclusive, 43 so that a director
could seek to contract for greater indemnification as a condition to accepting
a directorship. Of course, a court might impose public policy limits on the
extent to which indemnification in excess of that permitted by statute should
be allowed, but it is unclear just when such limits would be invoked.'
Thus, based on the statutes, a director knew that he could incur liability
if he knowingly declared a dividend other than as authorized by law, although
that was qualified by permitting him to rely on financial information prepared
by company officials whom he believed to be reliable. He knew that he
should be indemnified for any action brought by anyone other than the

39. Id. § 351.345 (1986).
40. Id. § 351.355 (1986).
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1991).
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.355(8).

43. Id. § 351.355(6).
44. Dicta in cases such as Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888
(3d Cir. 1953), suggested that Delaware courts might invalidate or refuse to enforce
contracts inconsistent with the public policy reasons for allowing indemnification. But
see Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339 (Del. 1983) (holding that a
corporation may grant indemnification rights beyond those provided by statute);
Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Serv., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 562 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding that contractual agreement obligating corporation to indemnify director for
legal expenses was authorized under Delaware's nonexclusion provision, absent a

finding that the director had violated any fiduciary duty owed to the corporation).
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corporation or someone suing on its behalf if he acted in good faith, and
reasonably believed that the action was in the corporation's best interests.
Even in the case of actions brought by or on behalf of the corporation, he
could be indemnified if, in addition, he was not guilty of negligence or
misconduct; even if his behavior did not meet that standard, a court might still
allow indemnification. Misconduct is fairly easy to identify, but "negligence"
is a somewhat slipperier concept. There is also considerable slack in the
concept of "good faith," and "reasonable belief' is "soft" as well.
The real specification of standards of directors' behavior was the common
law.
Missouri courts tended to follow the common law of other
states-initially Illinois, more recently Delaware. Consistent with that
approach, the courts recognized duties of care and loyalty, and also recognized
the business judgment rule as a complement to the duty of care. A director
was expected to perform his functions with the degree of care that a
reasonable person in a like situation would exercise under similar circumstances: a "reasonable, prudent director" standard.45 The Missouri application of
the business judgment rule is also quite traditional: when directors, in good
faith and in the absence of fraud or self-dealing, exercise a business judgment,
the courts will not examine the merits of that decision, unless the matter on
which the directors acted was not one committed to their discretion. 6
Although the Delaware court seems to have incorporated a standard of care
into the "good faith" element,47 the Missouri court has not yet done so

explicitly.48 The duty of loyalty runs to the corporation, and requires that the
director avoid placing himself, or allowing himself to be placed, in a situation
in which his personal interest conflicts with that of the corporation, i.e., he
must avoid conflicts of interest.49 This is tempered, however, by the

45. Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 223 S.W. 423, 426 (Mo. 1920).
46. That is, if the matter was reserved for shareholder approval, a board's efforts
to take action would be ineffective. Although there are no Missouri cases directly on
point, two Delaware cases are illustrative. See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501
A.2d 401, 406 (Del. 1985); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1036
(Del. 1985). Moreover, the courts will conduct an antecedent inquiry into the
directors' good faith and will determine whether fraud or self-dealing are present
before conferring the protection of the business judgment rule. Broski v. Jones, 614
S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
47. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
48. Louis & BROWN, supra note 10, § 24.3 at 536, notes the idea of due care
involves some element of prudence, at least when the corporation in question is a
financial institution. See State ex reL Moore v. State Bank of Hallsville, 561 S.W.2d
722, 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
49. See Chemical Dynamics, Inc. v. Newfeld, 728 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987); Binz v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964).
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adoption, in 1983, of Missouri Revised Statute section 351.327 which, like
section 144 of the Delaware Corporation Law, permits contracts between the
corporation and interested officers or directors under specified circumstanc50
es.
The difficulty in fleshing out these standards results from the relative
paucity of cases decided in Missouri. Courts have been forced to look to
decisions in other jurisdictions to resolve issues; not surprisingly, they have
tended to look to Delaware, because of its comparatively rich body of case
law. However, the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,5' as well as others
dealing with directors' responses to hostile takeover bids,52 created concerns
for corporate counsel. For example, the business judgment rule presumably
applied to all aspects of directors' actions, including the response to takeover
bids, at least insofar as the matter involves only the level of care required. 53
Nevertheless, the extent to which a director's business judgment could
consider the effect of a particular action on constituencies other than
shareholders was not clear, although there had been suggestions in some cases
that such considerations were appropriate, as being in the long-term interests
of the corporation. Even then, however, the courts had given only limited
consideration to the weight directors could accord to impacts on other
constituencies. At least one influential court had said that consideration of
other constituencies was permissible, so long as it did not detract from
primary consideration of the interests of shareholders.55
These uncertainties lead to a search for legislation that might be more
supportive of management, or at least provide the bases to argue that

management's actions were proper.
50. The transaction will be sustained if it is approved, after full disclosure of the
details of the transaction and the conflict, by a majority of the disinterested directors
(even though it be less than a quorum of the board), or by a majority of the
shareholders, or if the court deems the transaction fair to the corporation as of the time
it was approved. See DEL. GEN. CoRP. L. § 144 (1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 357.327
(Supp. 1993).
51. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
52. E.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988);
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
53. E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Of
course, because tender offers raise serious conflict of interest issues for directors,
courts are justified-required-in scrutinizing closely the directors' conduct to ensure
that their action is not tainted by their self-interest, which would invoke the duty of
loyalty and, hence, rule out the application of the business judgment rule.
54. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989);
Steven M.H. Wallman, The ProperInterpretationof CorporateConstituencyStatutes
and Formulationof DirectorDuties, 21 STETsON L. REv. 163, 168-170 (1991).

55. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Missouri has a long history of attempting to erect statutory takeover
defense measures. The "first generation," the Missouri Takeover Bid
Disclosure Act,56 was held invalid under the Commerce Clause"7 following

the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. Mite Corp."

The statute was

amended in 198659 in an effort to eliminate the unconstitutional features, and
has not been relitigated.
Meanwhile, in 1984, Senator Webster, then Majority Leader of the
Missouri Senate, introduced Senate Bill 409, which amended several sections
of the Business Corporation Act and added the Control Share Acquisition
provision," which provides that, unless a corporation "opts out" by a
provision in its articles of incorporation, any acquisition of "control shares"6 '

56. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 409.500 - .566 (1978), adopted in 1978 Mo. Laws, S.B.
820. This was.an addition to the Missouri Securities Act, and appears to have been
patterned on the Illinois statutory scheme.
57. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
58. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
59. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.500 - .566 (1986).

60. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.407 (1986) (amended 1989).
61. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.015.(5) (Supp. 1993) provides:
"Control shares" means shares that, except for this chapter, would have
voting power with respect to shares of an issuing public corporation that,
when added to all other shares of the issuing public corporation owned by
a person or in respect to which that person may exercise or direct the
exercise of voting power, would entitle that person, immediately after
acquisition of the shares, directly or indirectly, alone or as a part of a
group, to exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power of the issuing
public corporation in the election of directors within any of the following
ranges of voting power:
(a) One-fifth or more but less than one-third of all voting power;
(b) One-third or more but less than a majority of all voting power;
(c) A majority or more of all voting power; ....

Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.015(4) (Supp. 1993) provides that "Control share
acquisition means the acquisition, directly or indirectly by any person of ownership
of, or the power to direct the exercise of voting power with respect to, issued and
outstanding control shares...."
Finally, Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.015(10) (Supp. 1993) defines "Issuing public
corporation" to mean
a corporation incorporated under the laws of Missouri... that has: (a) One
hundred or more shareholders; (b) Its principal place of business, its
principal office, or substantial assets within Missouri; and (c) One of the
following: [a] More than 10% of its shareholders resident in Missouri; [b]
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must be preauthorized by a vote of the shareholders of the target corporation
or the control shares will have no voting rights. The bill specified procedures
for obtaining the approval of the shareholders and gave dissenting shareholders
appraisal rights. The bill was duly passed and signed by the governor.62
Then, in 1986, Senator Webster introduced Senate Bill 565.63 As
introduced, the bill was limited to amending the section of the Business
Corporation Act relating to election and removal of directors.' Senate Bill
565 was referred to the Committee on Miscellaneous Bills, of which Senator
Webster was a member. 5 After a hearing, that Committee reported the bill
to the Senate, recommending that the bill "do pass"." At this time, the bill
apparently still related only to the election and removal of directors.
Senator Webster next moved that Senate Bill 565, with Senate Substitute,
be called from the Informal Calendar and again taken up for perfection.67
The Senate Substitute significantly broadened the scope of Senate Bill 565 by

More than 10% of its shares owned by Missouri residents; or [c] 10,000
shareholders resident in Missouri....
62. The effective date for the bill was June 13, 1984. In 1985, House Bill 117
attempted to extend § 351.407 to foreign corporations with substantial Missouri
connections. The language was drawn so that only TWA qualified. That effort was
held unconstitutional in Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985), insofar

as it applied to corporations not incorporated in Missouri. The case does not speak to
the validity of § 351.407 as applied to Missouri corporations, but its validity is subject
to challenge on the same basis as the federal court invalidated a voting-type "poison
pill" in Asarco, Inc. v. A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985) (applying New Jersey
law)-it creates different voting rights among shares of the same class or series. See
also Ministar Acquiring Corp. v. AME Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
63. JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI SENATE, 83rd Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., 28

(1986).
64. MO. REv. STAT. § 351.315 (Supp. 1993). The amendment was to change
subdivision 2 of that section, relating to removal of directors, to read:
Unless otherwise specified in the articles of incorporation [t]he entire
board of directors may be removed, with or without cause, by a vote of the
holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of
directors. [New matter underlined.]
This would permit a corporation to provide, in its articles, that the board could
be removed only for cause; it was thus part of the package of antitakeover reforms,
because this would make it more difficult for successful bidders for control of the
corporation to install directors of their own choosing immediately, and thus would
serve as a deterrent to any attempt to acquire control of the corporation.
65. JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI SENATE, supra note 64, at 97; OFFICIAL MANUAL,
STATE OF MISSOURI 105 (1985-1986).
66. JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI SENATE, supra note 64, at 296.

67. Id at 386.
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adding a number of defenses against takeovers: it increased the types of stock
that could be issued,68 eliminated the statutory right of the holders of a given
percentage of voting stock to call special meetings of the shareholders,69
implicitly permitted the articles to provide for shares having multiple or
fractional voting rights,7" amended the provision on indemnification to
include service on the board of an employment benefit plan,7 added a
provision on stock options and warrants,72 and added the "other constituency"
statute.73 The fragmentary legislative history available in Missouri does not
reveal the source of the Senate Substitute for Senate Bill 565; it apparently did
not originate in the Committee on Miscellaneous Bills, for then it would have
been designated as "Committee Substitute." After the Substitute was adopted,
perfected and printed, and passed, it moved rapidly through the House, and
was signed by the Governor on May 6th.7'
The Business Combination Act 75 was also adopted in 1986. This Act
restricts combinations between certain Missouri corporations76 and "interested

68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.180 (1986) was amended to make it possible to
authorize "poison pill preferred" and other kinds of stock that had been developed to
aid in fending off unwanted takeover bids.
69. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.225 (1978). As amended, the section now
provides that special meetings can be called by such persons as are specified in the
articles of incorporation; formerly, the holders of one-fifth or more of the outstanding
shares had the right to call a special meeting. This change makes it more difficult for
a successful hostile takeover bidder to call a special meeting in order to replace the
existing board of directors with directors of his own choosing; it thus operates to deter
takeover efforts. See id.§ 351.225 (1986).
70. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 351.180, .245.1 (1986). This would permit a corporation
to authorize a class of preferred stock and give the board of directors the power to
prescribe the relative rights of that class. Under that grant of authority, the board
could create a class of preferred stock having multiple voting rights sufficient to
outvote the outstanding common stock and place that class of preferred stock in
friendly hands-like an employee benefit plan the trustees of which are members of
or chosen by management. If sustained, such a class of stock would render a takeover
impossible.
71. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.355 (1986).
72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.182 (1986).
73. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (1986). As initially adopted, § 351.347 related
only to the board's exercise of its business judgment in the context of responding to
acquisition proposals. See the title and the introductory language of the section:
"Acquisition proposals, board may make recommendation.1. In exercising its business judgment concerning any acquisition proposal ...
74. Status Report, June 27, 1986, p. 2.
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.459 (1986).
76. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.459.1(13) (1986) defines "resident domestic
corporation" as a corporation organized in Missouri with 100 or more shareholders, its
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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shareholders,"77 for a period of five years following the acquisition of the
shares making one an interested shareholder unless the board of directors of
the Missouri corporation approved the acquisition of the shares before the
interested shareholder acquired them. It thus would preclude a hostile
takeover from being completed for a period of five years following the date
upon which the would-be acquiror obtains twenty percent of the shares.7"
Finally, in 1989, Senator Webster sponsored Senate Bill 141, which
modified several sections of the Corporation Act. As it emerged from the
Conference Committee and finally passed, it eliminated mandatory cumulative
voting for the election of directors, as mandated by the voters' amendment
of Section 6 of Article XI of the Missouri Constitution, amended sections
351.407 and 351.459 (the Control Share Acquisition and Business Combination sections), and broadened section 351.347 to provide that the board could
consider other constituencies in any exercise of its business judgment.79
About all that can be inferred from this limited sketch of legislative
history is that the adoption of the "other constituency" statute was part of the
antitakeover "package" the legislature was putting in place. Indeed, the very
heading of section 351.347-"Acquisition proposals, board may make
recommendation"-affirms that conclusion. It also appears, in view of the
haste with which the legislation was adopted and the circuitous route by which
the "other constituency" provision was added, that there was no material
discussion of that provision in either the legislative committee to which it was
referred or on either floor of the legislature. Significantly, none of these bills
was proposed by the Missouri Bar Association Committee on Corporation,
Banking and Business Laws. Indeed, The Missouri Bar declined to take a
position on Senate Bill 565, on the ground that it was "not within the scope"
of the Bar's legislative activities.8" Interestingly, the Bar members who

principal place of business, principal office, or substantial assets in Missouri, and one
of the following: more than 10% of its shareholders resident in Missouri; more than
10% of its shares owned by Missouri residents; or, 10,000 shareholders resident in

Missouri. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.459.4 (1986) then excludes corporations not subject
to § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 unless the articles otherwise provide.
77. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.459.1(10)(a) & (b) (1986) defines "interested
shareholder" as someone who acquires 20% or more of the outstanding shares of a
resident domestic corporation.
78. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.459.2 (Supp. 1993).
79. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347.3 (Supp. 1993): "Nothing in this section shall
require any director or corporation to respond to any particular acquisition proposal nor
preclude directors, in exercising their business iudgment in other contexts, from
considering factors such as those enumerated in subsection I of this section." [New
matter underlined].
80. Telephone conversations with the Legislative Liaison of The Missouri Bar
(October 26 and 29, 1991) (memorandum of conversation on file with author). When
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made this recommendation to the governing board were not active members
of the Missouri Bar Committee on Corporation, Banking and Business Law
[as the Business Law Committee was known at the time], although that
Committee had several subcommittees active in drafting possible legislation
at that time, some of whom also served as legislative review consultants for
The Missouri Bar. It is unclear who determined to refer the proposed
legislation to those particular individuals. To be sure, the Missouri Bar-like
other bar associations-is subject to many of the same sorts of public-choice
pressures as is the legislature. It seems curious, then, that the proponents of
this legislation chose to circumvent the usual routine for Bar-sponsored
legislation; it tends to reinforce the suspicion that this is, indeed, special
interest legislation, intended to foster the interests of management at the
expense of the shareholders.
IV. SOURCES OF THE LEGISLATION
Missouri's Control Share Acquisition Acte8' and Business Combination
in their present formats, both appear to have been drawn on their
Indiana counterparts.83 That is, the language of both statutes is almost
identical. As the brief legislative history indicates,84 however, the origins of
the "other constituency" provisions are less clear. Commentators have pointed
out that other constituency provisions originated in the articles of incorporation of companies concerned about being targets for takeover attempts.85
And, it has been noted,86 that in at least seventeen states, antitakeover
legislation was adopted at the behest of a single company with important local
connections. There is scant direct evidence of such involvement in Missouri
with respect to most of the antitakeover legislation, although it is fairly clear
that the 1985 attempt to broaden the Missouri Control Share Acquisition Act
Act,82

pressed, the Liaison indicated that there was strong feeling among some members of
the Bar that the organization should only take positions on legislation relating to the
administration of justice and the courts.
81. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.407 (Supp. 1993).
82. Id. § 351.459 (Supp. 1993).
83. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-5 to -9 (Burns 1989) and IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-1-43-1 to -24 (Bums 1989), respectively.
84. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for
Perspective,46 Bus. LAw. 1355, 1356 (1991); Sommer, supra note 25, at 39.
86. Jonathon R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National
Economy, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 467, 469-70; Kenneth B. Davis, Epilogue: The Role of
the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 491, 492 n.4
(enumerating 17 states in which this occurred); Romano, supra note 26, at 122-34
(focusing on the Connecticut statute).
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to include foreign corporations was pushed, and expedited through the
legislature, on behalf of a single company." Based on these circumstances,
and the somewhat circuitous way in which these bills-especially the other
constituency provision-were adopted,88 it seems more probable than not that
the legislation emanated from pro-management sources.
Many of the proponents of constituency statutes89 are involved with the
Business Roundtable, or otherwise represent large public corporations.' But,

87. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. At least, the language of the
amendment included only one corporation: TWA, which was then the target of a
takeover bid from Carl Icahn. House Bill 117 extended the coverage of Missouri's
Control Share Acquisition Act, Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.575.2 (Supp. 1985) to "those
foreign corporations that are common carriers that have benefitted from physical
facilities financed by Missouri political subdivisions and that have over 7,500
employees in Missouri." Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
Counsel for defendants conceded that TWA was the only corporation known to meet
those requirements. Id. at 1406 n.2.
The court sketched the approval of House Bill 117 as follows:
House Bill No. 117 (original H.B. No. 117) was prefiled on December
3, 1984. Original H.B. No. 117 was passed by the Missouri House on April
25, 1985. On May 6, 1985, original H.B. No. 117 was referred to the
Senate Commerce Committee.
Beginning on May 29, 1985, legislative action on original H.B. No.
117 accelerated. On that day, original H.B. No. 117 emerged from the
Senate Commerce Committee as Senate Committee Substitute for House
Bill No. 117 (H.B. No. 117). The bill had gone from 35 words in the
original H.B. No. 117 to over 1,600 words in H.B. No. 117. Later that day,
the rules were suspended and H.B. No. 117 was read for the third time and
passed by the Senate.
The next day, May 30, 1985, the Senate and House appointed a
conference committee. After the conference committee reported later that
day, the House and the Senate passed H.B. No. 117. Still later that day, the
President Pro Tem of the Senate, the Speaker of the House and the
Governor signed H.B. No. 117 and it became effective immediately.
Id. at 1405-06 (footnote omitted).
88. See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text (legislative history sketch).
89. E.g., Charles Hansen, author of the article cited in note 85, supra,represented

the Roundtable at the deliberations on the ALI Corporate Government Project.
90. E.g., Steven Wallman, whose article is cited supranote 54, is a partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of the firm of Covington & Burling. Mr. Wallman was codrafter of the first constituency statute enacted in Pennsylvania in 1983, and of the
1990 amendments to that statute.

The Business Roundtable, of course, consists primarily of attorneys who are "in
house" counsel of public corporations. Minow, supra note 26, at 221-24. The
Roundtable has shifted from a position of fostering accountability to shareholders to
one of Chief Executive Officer monarchy, Minow notes. Id. at 203. The Delaware
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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as Professors Klein and Coffee have pointed out,9' virtually everything
accomplished by the states' other constituency statutes could be done by
amendment of the articles of incorporation. And, as noted earlier,' the first
other constituency provisions originated in that fashion. Why, then, did the
advocates of these provisions seek to include such provisions in the statutes-especially when one of the proponents suggested that the typical statute
would have little or no effect on the decisions courts would reach?93
One possible explanation for this preference for statutory enactmentrather
than appropriate provisions in the articles of incorporation is that, for existing
corporations, such provisions would have to be incorporated by an amendment
to the articles, which would require a shareholder vote. However, if a statute
is adopted that applies to all corporations except those that provide in their
articles that the statutory limitation shall not apply to them, the shareholder
vote can be avoided.94 This has become more critical for corporate counsel
because institutional shareholders, who must focus on large public corporations, are beginning to vote against management proposals-such as

"staggered" boards and "poison pills"-that are seen as defensive devices. 95
Perhaps "opt-in" provisions are preferable because they permit the shareholders to decide whether they want to have "their" corporation include such a
limitation on liability.96

courts also have retreated from some of their more pro-shareholder accountability
holdings, like Smith v. Van Gorkom, after influential corporate lawyers suggested that
corporations should consider incorporating elsewhere.
91. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE JR., BUsINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 194 (5th ed. 1993).
92. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
93. See Hansen, supra note 85, at 1375. Hansen concluded that these statutes

should be considered primarily as a codification of the common law for jurisdictions
that had not developed case law precedent without such a statute. See id
94. That is, the statute would be an "opt-out" type, like present MO. REV. STAT.

§ 351.407 (Supp. 1993). An "opt-out" provision would apply a limitation to all
corporations incorporated in Missouri except those that provided in the articles of
incorporation that the statutory limitation should not apply to them. In contrast, an

"opt-in" provision would permit corporations, by making appropriate provisions in their

articles of incorporation, to limit or eliminate the liability of directors for actions taken
in their capacities as directors except for situations involving a breach of the duty of
loyalty or other fraudulent acts.
95. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Harry Zirlin, The InstitutionalInvestorand Corporate
Ownership, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 341, 356, 358 (1992); Karmel, supra note 1, at 83.
96. Of course, as Professor Robert Lawless has noted in conversations with the
author, to require an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation in effect turns the
other constituency statutes on their heads, in that it permits one constituency-the
shareholders-to determine whether or not other constituencies should have a place at
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V. THE CHANGING SHAREHOLDER MIX
The traditional view has been that directors are to exercise their business
judgment to the end of maximizing shareholder wealth. 97 Indeed, their
obligations run primarily to the holders of common stock98 who hold the
residual interests in the corporation. 9 Because they are the residual
claimants, they bear the highest degree of risk, and therefore have the most
control (at least in theory). Shareholders elect boards of directors to manage
the business and affairs of the corporation; over time, boards of directors have
adopted various approaches to executive compensation-such as stock options
and deferred compensation partly in an attempt to align the interests of
managers more closely to those of the common stockholders.'
The view
that boards should look primarily to the interests of common stockholders still
underlies many judicial opinions considering the responses of boards of
directors to acquisition proposals.'' It is also implicit in many of the
criticisms of the recent takeover wave. 2
However, many modem developments have tended to undercut this
traditional view of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of the
directors' management. The rise of special classes of stock-such as "poison
pill preferred," super-voting stock, and "blank check" preferred-has
attenuated the common shareholders' already limited role in management,
because those classes are designed so that the holders can block acquisition

the table.
97. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders,
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end."); ALl PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 2.01(a) (Proposed Final Draft, March 31, 1992).
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 976-79, cites Dodge as a case rejecting board consideration of nonshareholder constituencies in an "operational" decision, but applying the
business judgment rule to sustain most of what Henry Ford wanted to do-construct
an expanded manufacturing facility. Bainbridge is consistent with others who quote
the famous passage from Dodge to the effect that maximization of shareholder profit
is the standard by which to measure directorial performance. All of us, however, tend
to overlook the fact-not clearly articulated in the opinion-that Dodge also involved
a variant of a freeze-out of the Dodge brothers by Henry Ford, the majority
shareholder. The case is thus a precursor of cases like Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype,
328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
98. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 119-20, 126-28.
99. Id.
100. Id.
at 172.
101. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986).
102. Whitehill, supra note 1, at 113; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 973.
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proposals that are favored by most of the common shareholders. 3 Developments in "financial engineering" have produced new financial products that
"strip out" the claim on earnings from the claim on assets at liquidation,
further diluting the classic concept of the roles of directors and shareholders.1° Finally, the increase in institutional shareholdings in major corporations0 5 marks a shift from individual investors, who may need more judicial

103. Obviously, if such special classes are created by amendment of the
company's articles of incorporation, such amendment will have to be approved by
shareholders. Such amendments will be instigated by management, however, and in
most cases can be approved by a mere majority of the outstanding voting shares. Cf
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.090 (Supp. 1993). The common shareholders, as a widely
dispersed group, are in a poor position to organize to resist a proposal that is more in
management's interest than in that of the shareholders, if they even recognize what is
happening. Shareholders also suffer from "free rider" problems and "rational apathy."
That is, it may be too expensive for an individual shareholder to inform himself
adequately on a matter submitted for shareholder approval; small shareholders may
choose to rely on the efforts of larger shareholders-institutions-to perform the
research and vote appropriately. These shareholders are "free riders" on their efforts.
For the same reasons, it is rational for them to be apathetic about matters presented to
the shareholders: their holdings are too small to have any effect, anyway. Further, the
statute permits the articles to give the directorsthe power to set the terms of preferred
stock. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.180(1) (1986). This power has often been used to
create "poison pill preferred."
104. For example, beginning in 1983, the Americus Shareowner Service
Corporation (ASSC) has sponsored unit investment trusts, the Americus Trusts, for
shares of selected firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American
Stock Exchange. These trusts provide investors with two new kinds of securities,
known by their acronyms "Prime" (for Prescribed Right to Income and Maximum
Equity) and "Score" (for Special Claim on Residual Equity). The owner of a share of
IBM stock, for example, can deposit his share with ASSC, receiving in exchange one
Prime and one Score. Then, the shareholder who is interested in current income can
retain the Prime and sell the Score to an investor who is willing to speculate on a
potentially high return at some time in the indefinite future. Thus, the introduction of
Primes and Scores broadens investors' portfolio choices. Clearly, however, the
investor is different from the ordinary holder of common stock. Although the holder
of the Prime retains the right to direct the voting ofthe underlying stock, she has given
up the residual claim on assets beyond the specified maximum. See S. Deshpande &
V. Jog, Primes and Scores: What They Are and How They Perform, in THE
INVESTMENTS READER 260 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1991).
See generally CLIFFORD W. SMITH JR. & CHARLES W. SMITHSON, THE
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING (1990); Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial

Products,the Modern Process ofFinancialInnovation,and the Puzzle ofShareholder
Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1274 (1991).
105. Whitehill, supra note 1, at 119. In 1989, the average ownership of
institutions of the equity of the top 100 corporations was 53.2%, and of the top 50
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protection against managerial overreaching, to sophisticated institutional
investors who could, if they chose, protect themselves through appropriate
provisions in articles of incorporation, contractual provisions such as control
puts, 1"6 by voting in corporate elections, or through a combination of these
methods." 7 To what extent if at all, should these changes in the nature of
shareholders affect the interpretation of other constituency statutes? Before
attempting to answer that, it is necessary to address some other emerging
issues.
Some commentators"0 8 describe the corporation not as an entity, but as
a "nexus of contracts." That is, the organization is viewed as a group of

identifiable participants: investors, lenders, customers, suppliers, employees
and managers. These participants negotiate an equilibrium position among

corporations was 50%. Id. Whitehall also states that it has been estimated that all
institutional investors currently hold in excess of 45% of total equities in the United
States. Id. He attributes the recent increase in takeovers, in part, to the increase in
institutional shareholdings, with their short-term investment horizon. Id. (citing
Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors, in CAPITAL MARKETS: A
SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH AT THE COLUMBIA INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
PROJECT 22 (1990)); Karmel, supra note 1, at 68-69.

106. A "control put" is a contractual undertaking by the issuing corporation to
repurchase the shares at a stipulated price in the event of a shift in control. Such
undertakings have begun to appear in bond debentures and loan agreements. See
Macey, supra note 27, at 39 n.31 & accompanying text; John C. Coffee Jr., Unstable
Coalitions: CorporateGovernanceas a Multi-PlayerGame, 78 GEo. L.J. 1495, 151920 (1990).
107. See Robert Pozen, How Fidelity Votes, FIDELITY FOCuS, Fall 1993, at 24,
noting that, in its role as an investment manager, Fidelity Management & Research Co.
determines how to vote the funds' holdings in corporate elections, following guidelines
established by the independent trustees of the Fidelity funds.
Of course, there are practical and legal problems inhibiting institutions' exercise
of voting power. See, e.g., Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor
Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 152-163 (1988); Bernard S. Black,
ShareholderPassivityReexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). For a different
approach to resolving some of these issues, see George W. Dent Jr., Toward Unifying
Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,1989 Wis. L. REV. 881.
108. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory ofthe Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. & ECON. 305 (1976);
Symposium on the Distributionof Power Among CorporateManagers,Shareholders
and Directors, 20 J. FIN. & ECON. 3 (1988). See also Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problemsand the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); William A. Klein,
The Modern Business Organization:BargainingUnderConstraints,91 YALE L.J. 1521
(1982); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of ContractsApproach to Corporations: A
Comment on Easterbrookand Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989).
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themselves."° One implication from this view is that no single group of
participants (e.g., the shareholders) has a natural right to view themselves as
the owners of the firm. Thus, shareholders are not seen as "owners," but as
suppliers--"renters"--of equity capital: they are the "residual claimants" who
have special abilities to bear risk, which creditors, managers, and employees
tend not to have. If we regard shareholders merely as residual claimants who
have agreed to accept an uncertain future return because of their superior
ability to bear risk, there is less basis to decide that they are entitled to control
the firm. Perhaps other groups-managers or creditors-should share in
control. Indeed, in many ways, these "other constituencies" are more directly
affected than the shareholders: a shareholder who is properly diversified is
not affected by any particular takeover, because diversification eliminates the
firm-specific risk of the investment, but other constituencies-managers and
employees-contribute "human capital"-skills peculiar to the particular firm
In
and not readily transportable-that is necessarily firm-specific.1
addition, many executive compensation devices (e.g., stock options) that are
intended to align managers' interests more closely with those of shareholders
have the ancillary effect of concentrating much of a manager's financial
capital in the stock of the single firm by which she is employed."'
There is, however, an economic argument that voting rights should vest
primarily in the residual claimants." 2 The residual claimants are uniquely
interested in the firm's overall profitability, but incur high "agency costs" in
attempting to monitor managers."' Creditors, managers, and employees are
essentially fixed claimants, who are satisfied if their claims are repaid; they
will tend to resist risky activities."' Because they have less interest in the

109. This perspective is well set-out in JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 28-30 (3d ed. 1989).
110. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law to FacilitateLabor-ManagementCooperation,78 CORNELL L. REv.

901, 905-917 (1993), Coffee, supra note 2, at 17.
There is also a generational issue: to which shareholders do directors owe their
obligations, current shareholders or those who will be shareholders in the future?
Also, note the potential divergences between the interests of long-term and those of

short-term shareholders, many of whom may be arbitragers who have taken a
substantial position in the stock of a company rumored to be a potential takeover
target. These short-term shareholders are most interested in the premium over market

price offered by the would-be acquiror, while long-term investors may have very
different interests. See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 25, at 50.
111. Coffee, supra, note 2, at 18. See infra text accompanying notes 175-80.
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw,
26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983).
113. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 108, at 308-09.
114. Aq Klein & Coffee point out, there is an inherent conflict of interest between
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

overall performance of the firm, creditors and other fixed claimants can
bargain for contractual protections and do not need representation on the board
to monitor the firm's performance." 5 Only the residual owners lack the
ability, at least in large corporations, to protect themselves contractually, and
therefore need the protections of the statute and of the fiduciary obligations
of officers and directors. Many of the managerial compensation plans in
vogue today are designed to reduce the shareholders' agency costs by aligning
managers' interests more closely to those of shareholders. Here, the other
constituency statutes, by enabling managers to look after their own interests
rather than those of the shareholders, work directly against these carefullywrought schemes.
Expanding the range of constituents that the board may consider
essentially eliminates any standard by which to evaluate director performance. 6 As will be discussed," 7 these statutes are riddled with
ambiguities and questions. At least the old common law standards gave
something to gauge a director's actions. The Revlon court said". that the

the holders of fixed claims and the residual owners, which extends into operational
decisions such as investment strategies. The holders of fixed claims, in order to ensure
that their claims will be paid, will tend to favor "safe" investments, so long as they
will generate sufficient cash flow to pay their fixed claims. A higher degree of risk
benefits the residual claimants, who will tend to favor more risky ventures. KLEIN &
COFFEE, supra note 91, at 226.

115. This, of course, is the reason for the protective covenants in bond indentures.
Id. at 258. Managers may be able to secure "golden parachutes" in their employment
contracts; in addition, top management is generally able to strongly influence the
selection of directors. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY
(1971); Myles L. Mace, The President and the Board of Directors,50 HARV. BUS.
REV. 37, 37-49 (Mar.-Apr. 1972). The recent difficulties at IBM and some other large
corporations have led to greater activism by institutional shareholders, who have forced
changes at the top. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. Unionized
employees can seek plant closing provisions in their contracts, although that is more
difficult. Recently, communities have begun to exact commitments from corporations
in exchange for tax abatements. See Hayes, supra note 4, at 136, noting commitments
Arlington, Texas got from General Motors in exchange for tax abatements granted for
a 10-year period; GM apparently agreed to certain payments if they abandoned the

plant within 5 years. The article also notes the lawsuit between Ypsilanti, Michigan,
and General Motors over GM's plans to close the Willow Run assembly plant after
securing tax relief from the community.
116. Despite their ambiguity, the standards set out supra text accompanying notes
41-53, are superior to the total negation of standards flowing from the consideration

of other constituencies. See William J. Carney, DoesDefiningConstituenciesMatter?,
59 U. CrN. L. REv. 385, 420-24 (1990).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 132-49.
118. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181-82
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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directors owe their obligations to the corporation, which the court apparently
equated to the interests of long-term shareholders. The court did say that the
board could consider the impact on other constituencies, but that consideration

had to be related to the interests of the shareholders." 9

The "financial engineering" referred to previously"20 has been done
externally, to a great extent, by creative investment bankers seeking to appeal
to investors' differing appetites. Some of the hybrid securities used in
leveraged buy-outs' and as takeover defenses" also reflect financial
engineering notions, to be sure. Still, these hybrid or derivative products
attain value because of the protections developed for the underlying securities-essentially common stock-from which they have been derived."
Hence, even these innovations support protections for the holders of the
underlying securities.
It is easy to think of institutional investors as sophisticated investors who
can look out for themselves. Of course, many institutional, shareholders are
the pension funds of ordinary working-class folks, or the vehicles for

(Del. 1986).
119. Id.
120. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
121. E.g., PIK Preferred (payment in kind preferred) in which the preferred
dividend may be paid in additional shares of the preferred, at least for the first few
years. Most of these instruments require that cash dividends be paid at some time in
the future. Cf. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 376 n.5.
122. E.g., "poison-pill preferred"-special types of preferred stock issued by

potential target corporations with rights that are designed specifically to make
unwanted takeover attempts difficult or impossible. The unique feature of a poison pill
is that it gives additional rights to shareholders when an aggressor makes a public
tender offer for target shares, or acquires a specified percentage of target shares. The
additional rights may be additional voting rights for shareholders other than the
aggressor (a "voting" poison pill), or additional financial rights in the target (e.g., the
right to acquire additional shares or indebtedness of the target at a bargain price if the
pill is activated-a "flip-in" poison pill), or rights to buy aggressor shares at a bargain
price in the event of a back-end merger between the target and the person whose
tender offer originally triggered the poison pill (a "flip-over" pill). Generally, management can redeem the pill at a nominal price before the rights become vested; the pill
is therefore a negotiating device. In that regard, Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.459(5) (Supp.
1993), the "Business Combination" section, may have the effect of a poison pill. See
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS § 17.13 (1989).

123. That is, if the underlying common stock cannot pay a dividend, then the
SCORE (see supra note 104 and accompanying text) is worthless, and if the common
stock loses its residual, liquidation value, then the PRIME is worthless. By the same

token, PIK preferred depends on the company remaining viable so that it will someday
be able to pay cash dividends, as promised. Thus, all these instruments depend on the
underlying vitality of the residual claimants, the holders of the common stock.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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individuals seeking to save for retirement. Although the institutions can afford
to, and many do, employ skilled investment analysts, these investors remain
surrogates for their beneficial owners, and it is these beneficial owners who
deserve protection.' 24 Institutions could be more active in attempting to
influence management, and some have.'25 The California Public Employees
Retirement System (CalPERS) has been particularly active; for example, it has
introduced shareholder proposals to repeal "poison pills" and has voted against
antitakeover amendments.' 26 Not surprisingly, such institutional activism,
124. Indeed, the SEC has directed pension fund managers to utilize their proxies
for the benefit of plan participants. Ferrara & Zirlin, supra note 95, at 352 n.43
(citing Marcia Parker & Marlene Givant, Executives Warned of Proxy Vote Liability,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, May 18, 1987, at 1, 58).
125. Ferrara & Zirlin, supra note 95, at 356, note that professional portfolio

managers have tended to oppose poison pill plans. Institutional investors take an active
part in introducing shareholder proposals to eliminate poison pills, opt out of the
takeover protection laws, and limit "golden parachute" arrangements. Id at 358. See
also Pozen, supra note 108, at 24, noting that Fidelity Investments has designated
Fidelity Management & Research Co. to vote shares held by the various funds
managed by Fidelity Investments at annual meetings of nearly 3,000 companies,
following guidelines established by the independent trustees of Fidelity funds. The
author notes that, although Fidelity funds usually support the positions recommended

by management, they will withhold votes, or vote against, proposals likely to affect
their stockholdings negatively, such as antitakeover devices. See also Michael Quint,
Teacher'sPension Fund Asks for Diverse Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, qt D6
(setting out guidelines issued by Teacher's Insurance Annuity Association/College
Retirement Equities Fund on how it would vote the $52 billion of corporate stocks it
holds); Michael Quint, Pension Group Lists 50 Companies as FinancialLaggards,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at D3 (reporting a list of companies identified by the
Council of Institutional Investors as performing poorly).
126. Ferrara & Zirlin, supra note 95, at 358 n.59 and accompanying text. See
also Karmel, supra note 1, at 83 (recounting CalPERS's request to the SEC for a

rulemaking project that proposed 48 changes in the proxy rules). More recently,
United Shareholders Association has been organized as a Washington advocacy group
on behalf of shareholders; this group subsequently supported the CalPERS petition, and
filed its own request for comprehensive revisions. Id. at 83-84.
In the wake of bad times, even IBM has found it necessary to overhaul its board,
creating a "governance" panel of outside directors-at least, in part, in response to
criticisms from shareholders' groups. See Michael W. Miller, IBM, Overhaulingits
Board, Will Create 'Governance'Panelof Outside Directors,WALL ST. J., July 30,

1993, at A3.
See also Joan E. Rigdon, Kodak Seeks Outsider To Be Chairman, CEO, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1993, at A3 (reporting that Kodak directors, in a special board meeting

called by the "outside" directors, forced the Chief Executive Officer to step down);
Joan E. Rigdon, More Senior Executives Get Hired by the Board,WALL ST. J., Aug.
18, 1993, at B1; Lilli Gordon, New DealforShareholders,WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1993,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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and particularly proposals for proxy reform that would make it easier for
shareholders to introduce matters for consideration and to communicate with
each other, has elicited opposition from business groups such as the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. and the Business Roundtable.'

Further, because of the size of their holdings, institutions can no longer avail
themselves of the "Wall Street walk"-selling their shares and reinvesting in

other securities-when they become dissatisfied; their sales would probably
have a pronounced negative impact on the market. We come back, then, to
the importance of the courts' looking to the interests of the shareholders, the
long-term investors, in evaluating managers' conduct. Consideration of other
constituencies conflicts with the shareholder's interests.
Further, it may be useful to classify corporations according to numbers
of shareholders, and evaluate the impact of "other constituency" legislation on
them separately. At one extreme, we have the closely held corporation,
consisting of few shareholders, all of whom are acquainted, and all or most
of whom have significant involvement in the corporation on a daily basis,
usually in some sort of management capacity. Such corporations are unlikely
to be able to take advantage of these provisions. Because of their size and
greater risk, the constituencies with which they deal can ask for, and get,
personal guarantees by at least the major shareholders, and those interested in
the firm are unlikely to be able to misappropriate assets belonging to others.
Among the shareholders themselves, because of their closeness and small
number, they are able to protect their own interests contractually. In the event
a controlling group forces its will on a reluctant minority, there is also the
possibility of a suit for breach of fiduciary duties a la Donahue,' or an
action for judicial dissolution on the ground of oppression." 9
At the other extreme are the mega-corporations such as IBM, AT&T, and
RJR Nabisco. Here, the "contractarian"'3 ° view of the shareholder as a
"renter of capital" who, incidentally, assumes some residual risk, is more
tenable. In many cases, it seems doubtful if even the shareholder views
himself as an "owner". Rather, he has "invested" his money in the hope that
it will increase in value. He chose to hold stock rather than a bond because
he hopes for a higher return than a bond will provide, especially in unsettled

at Al8; Paul Ingrassia, Board Reform Replaces the LBO, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1992,
at A14.
127. Karmel, supra note 1, at 84-85.

128. See supra note 97.
129. See, e.g., Mo. RFV. STAT. § 351.494.2(b) (Supp. 1993). Of course, the new,
optional close corporation sub-chapter, Mo. REv. STAT §§ 351.750-.935 (Supp. 1993),
will permit precise tailoring of an electing corporation's governance rules to protect
against such antics, if counsel for the organizers thinks of including them.
130. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

27

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 59

economic times when one must always consider the possibility of inflation.
Still more remote as an "owner" of a corporation is the "indirect" shareholder,
one who invests in a mutual fund or a pension or retirement plan that happens
to have that particular stock in its portfolio. Is either group of shareholders,
the "direct" or "indirect," a more compelling focus for judicial concern than
the employees of a plant that will be shut down, or a customer who will lose

a source of supply, or a bondholder who will find that the risk of her debt is
magnified by the additional indebtedness undertaken to finance a buy-out?
Between these two extreme situations lies a vast middle area, in which
there is, or probably should be, real ground for concern for the individual
shareholders' welfare. Consider a corporation with 75 to 125 shareholders,
most of whom are passive investors. Are they not entitled to something more
than the economists' flippant, "If they're adequately diversified, they're
protected from what happens to any one finn?"'' Most of these shareholders have no real basis to be able to influence management to put their interests
first; they are completely at the mercy of the controlling person or group.
And, it's no answer to say that they shouldn't complain because they should
have realized when they invested in this type of company that they might lack
liquidity and be completely at the mercy of management. When people are
getting together to organize a new business, they tend to be full of optimism
and often are blind to potential pitfalls. People just are not as rational as the
efficient market proponents think they should be. This group of shareholders
seems to be the group most likely to be victimized by legislation like the other
constituency statutes.
VI. PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUTES
Other constituency statutes are ambiguous and so affected with uncertainties as to virtually insure that they will wreak more havoc than they can
possibly cure. A partial list of the problems would certainly include the areas
mentioned below.
Most of the statutes, like Missouri's, are permissive, not mandatory.'
Therefore, some have contended that the statutes should not be construed as
creating a right of action in any of the enumerated categories.'
However,
only a few statutes specifically state that they do not create a right of
action.'
We are then left to wonder what courts in the other jurisdictions
will do; only litigation will determine that. It seems unlikely that, if a

131.
132.
133.
134.
§ 717(b)

See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
Contra CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West 1991).
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 987.
GA. CODE ANN § 14-2-202 (b)(5) (Harrison 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
(McKinney Supp. 1994); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (Supp. 1993).
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member of one of the nonshareholder constituencies filed suit, a court would
dismiss it out of hand.
The ambiguity in the statutes stems, in part, from the lack of guidance as
to how the various factors are to be considered or the weights to be given
"' That is, directors are given no guidance on these matters, and more
them. 35
importantly, courts have no guidelines by which to review directors' action
purportedly based upon consideration of other constituencies. Professor
Bainbridge 3 6 contends that this reflects a conscious legislative determination
to leave these issues to the discretion of the board of directors, subject to
judicial review of the self-dealing aspects. But, considering the haste with
which many of these statutes were adopted,'37 it is difficult to believe that
the respective legislatures had any intent, other than to satisfy whatever special
interest was pushing for the legislation. Of course, it would be appropriate to
follow Professor Macey's suggestion 38 and construe the statute in a publicregarding manner, thus transforming statutes designed to benefit special
interests (corporate management) into statutes that in fact serve the public
interest.
Clearly some of the factors enumerated in these statutes 139 are factors
that any board operating with due care would have to consider. Often, these
factors would be determinative. That is fine when we are talking about
structural decisions 4 ' but now Missouri's statute (like most of the others)
applies to any exercise of the board's business judgment, including "operational" decisions.' 4 ' Here, the effect of these statutes is less clear.'4 2
For example, the statutes provide no guidance as to how a board, or a
court, should accommodate conflicts between different constituencies.
Consider a hypothetical chemical company, ABC Co., operating in Missouri

135. Cf Bainbridge, supranote 3, at 988.
136. Id at 989-90.
137. See supra notes 74, 80 and accompanying text; see Romano, supra note 26,
at 125-28.
138. Jonathon R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 267
(1986).
139. E.g., the consideration being offered, or the possibility of illegality.
140. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 975, in which takeovers are defined as
"structural decisions"-those that relate to changes in the ownership structure of the
corporation.
141. Id "Operational decisions" are all those necessary to run the firm on a
continuing basis.
142. Professor Bainbridge argues that the business judgment rule should apply in
operational decisions, and that, in consequence, the other constituency statutes will not
change the legal regime in this area. Id. at 997-1002. As noted in the text, this is far
from certain.
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and employing 500 workers in a small town. It is clearly the largest employer
in the immediate area. But, it incurs considerable expense in meeting the
requirements of United States environmental protection laws, and management
recognizes that it also could save a substantial amount in labor costs by
moving to the maquiladorazone in Mexico. The ABC shareholders would
thus benefit in two ways by ABC's shutting down the Missouri plant and
moving the operation to Mexico: Increased profits due to lower labor cost and
no environmental protection expenses.' 43 The 500 American employees will
be hurt, as will the local community, by ABC's departure, but presumably 500
workers in Mexico will be working at good wages, and the Mexican
community will "benefit" from another U.S. plant. The global environment
may suffer, but the American environment will be relieved of an environmental threat, at least directly. Suppose that, on balance, the board of ABC
decides to remain where it is, in order to continue to support the employees
and the community, and to protect the global environment. Would the
directors' concern for these other constituencies insulate them from liability
to a shareholder? Even if the statute would protect the directors here, could
a court summarily dismiss a shareholder suit brought against the directors
challenging this decision? Or, conversely, if the ABC board determines to
place the interests of shareholders first and move to Mexico, could members
of the community or the employees recover in an action against the
board?'" Along the same line, because most of the statutes are permissive,
not mandatory, a board may consider these factors, but need not do so. How
is a board's decision not to consider some constituency to be judged? In the
ABC hypothetical, suppose the board decided that, from the standpoint of
employees, the move was a "zero sum" game, 45 and therefore it didn't
worry about the effect on employment. How should a court treat that
determination?
Although the traditional common law rules do not necessarily provide
greater certainty, at least they limit the number of possible groups that must
be considered, or that may challenge a transaction. Directors remain

143. Cf WILLIAM S. GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL
OF AmERICAN DEMOCRACY 391-92 (1992).
144. Of course, one can construct a fairly sophisticated argument to the effect that
the decision to keep the plant in Missouri, although it may depress profits somewhat
(at least in the short term), is in the long-term best interests of the shareholders as
well. Even if a court ultimately accepted this argument, it would justify summary
dismissal of a shareholder's action.
145. E.g., although one group of employees-the Americans-lose out, another
group-those in Mexico-gain, and so society as a whole isn't hurt. (This ignores
differing wage rates, but assuming that each plant meets the prevailing wage level of
its locale for that type of employment, it is difficult to fault the company for that.)
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accountable, to some degree, to shareholders. They cannot raise the specter
of considering some other group as a defense to a challenge.
To attempt to interpret the statutes in a public-regarding way, as
suggested by Macey, a court might determine that the ostensible goal of the
statute was to ensure that directors consider the effect of their actions on all
constituencies. In fact, the private interest was to protect incumbent managers
from displacement or challenge by disappointed parties. Then, the court might
decide that unless a board could demonstrate that its decision benefitted one
of the constituencies without making any of the others worse off, the directors
should be liable in damages to any of the groups who were adversely affected.
That would, it seems, be to interpret the statute in a public-regarding manner.
Note that even an operational decision does pose conflict of interest, selfdealing, problems. 146 Directors, in theory, are elected by shareholders;"
none of the other constituencies has any input on that decision. Therefore,
directors' self-interest should lead them to favor the interests of shareholders
over those of other constituencies, that is, the directors' decision to favor
shareholders may be tainted by self-interest, the desire to retain their
directorships and the perquisites that go with them. But, ordinarily the
business judgment rule does not apply when the director's action is tainted by
self-dealing. How, then, can we invoke the business judgment rule to insulate
directors' consideration, or lack of consideration, of other constituencies?
If, as was suggested earlier, these statutes are motivated in part by the
desire to protect directors from excessive liability, they do so only indirectly.
Why not do so more directly, as some states have? 148 And, why do some
states have both a provision permitting a corporation to limit directors'
liability and a nonshareholder constituency statute?'49
Moreover, it does not appear that a corporation could "opt out" of the
coverage of the statute. By its terms, the statute applies to all corporations.
There is no "unless the articles otherwise provide," nor must the corporation
adopt a provision in its articles or by-laws to compel directors to consider
these constituencies. Although the "nexus of contracts" school might argue
that shareholders should be able to elect not to be covered by a particular

146. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 975-76.
147. Of course, Mace's studies indicated that this is largely a myth, and that

directors are in fact usually selected by management. See MACE, supranote 115.
148. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1993) (permitting a

corporation to include in its articles of incorporation a clause limiting the directors'
exposure for breach of the duty of care). Although it is an opt-in statute, it does not
provide for periodic renewal of that clause.
149. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (d),(e) (West Supp. 1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-35-1(b), (e) (Bums 1989).
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statute, it is difficult to see a court giving effect to such a clause,,"0
particularly when there is no tradition of modifying the rules like that and
quite a long tradition of adhering to the statutorily-specified forms.
Another problem is that the statutes do not appear to reflect any
conscious consideration of the fundamental policy issue: what groups should
be considered in reaching these decisions?'
And, if there are perceived

dangers to groups external to the corporation who may require protection, is
it appropriate, as a matter of public policy, to charge corporate directors,
supposedly selected by the shareholders and therefore not a politically
responsible group, with responsibility for providing that protection? Or,
should those protections be provided by the state or some other outside body?
Finally, and most importantly, if the statute is given any effect at all,
does it not negate any and all duties owed by directors? That is, could a
board of directors insulate any action it wanted to take from suit simply by
claiming, "We considered the impact on (one or more of the other constituencies, and based our decision on that?" To be sure, as Bainbridge indicates,"' a court would want to examine the bona fides of the claimed
consideration of other constituencies' interests, but it should not be difficult
for reasonably competent corporate counsel to produce documentation, to
reflect such consideration.
VII. WHAT CONSTITUENCIES SHOULD BE PROTECTED?
Some of the problems with other constituency statutes arise from the
concern that no one has thought carefully about which constituencies need
protection.'
The "laundry list" set out in the statutes sounds good, but
expressly denies that it is exclusive.'54 The problem is bad enough when
consideration of other constituencies is required only in connection with
takeover bids; it is exacerbated when the scope of the statutes is extended to
all exercises of business judgment. Which groups have relationships with the
corporation similar to those of employees, suppliers, and customers? And,
how are each of these persons affected by the manifold variety of decisions

150. Cf authorities cited supra note 108.
151. Cf Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,40 STAN. L.
REV. 611 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 152-53.
152. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 998 & n.120.
153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347.1(4) (Supp. 1993) permits consideration of
these factors, among others: "Social, legal and economic effects on employees,
suppliers, customers and others having similar relationships with the corporation, and
the communities in which the corporation conducts its business .... "
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boards of directors must make? The effects of different sorts of decisions on
some of the groups likely to be impacted need to be considered.
A. Shareholders
The traditional view has been that shareholders are the owners of the
corporation, however their ownership has always been of a very attenuated
variety, at least in all but the closest of corporations. Shareholders' participation in management is very indirect, through the election and removal of
directors and approval of a limited number of extraordinary transactions, such
as mergers, sales of all or substantially all of the assets, amendment of the
articles of incorporation, or voluntary dissolution."'5
They accept an
unspecified claim on current earnings in the hope of a substantial residual
claim on the corporation upon dissolution.' 6 In corporations owned by
more than a very few shareholders, it is very difficult for the shareholders as
a group to protect themselves contractually against management self-dealing
or perfidy. That is the reason the concept of management's fiduciary duties
arose, to minimize the "agency costs" of public ownership of firms.'57 The
classic view, exemplified by the Dodge case,"' makes managers' duties run
exclusively to the corporation, representing the shareholders as a group. If
other groups sought the protection of fiduciary duties, courts generally looked
to their contract (their indenture) to see what protections they had provided for
themselves; if there were none there, the creditor was out of luck."5 9
In considering the impacts of directors' decisions on shareholders, and
others, it is useful to separate routine business decisions 60 from more
fundamental transactions.'
At one time, 62 fundamental changes required
unanimous shareholder approval. As that proved unworkable, the law relaxed
to permit such changes to be effectuated with majority (often super-majority)
approval, but protected dissenting shareholders by granting them the right to

155. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351.090, .093, .315, .425, .464 (Supp. 1993).
156. KLEIN & COFFEE, supranote 91, at 273-74.

157. Id. at 172-73.
158. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom,.200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953); Elliott
Assoc. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 838 F.2d 66 (2nd Cir. 1988). See
Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over
Corporate Bondholders' Rights, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 53-67, 131-132 (1989)
(arguing against creation of a fiduciary duty towards bondholders).
160. See supranote 146 and accompanying text; Bainbridge, supranote 3, at 975.
161. See supranote 141 and accompanying text; Bainbridge, supranote 3, at 975.
162. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 195, at 517 (1983).
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have their shares repurchased by the corporation at a "fair" price-the socalled "appraisal remedy."'6
Most of the discussion of other constituency statutes has focused on the
role of these statutes in the context of takeover bids, generally hostile
ones,"M where managers may be tempted to resist even a bid that is
beneficial to shareholders. This is the area in which directors' self-interest is
most apt to conflict with the interests of shareholders and other constituencies,
but similar concerns exist even in the context of negotiated transactions: the
concern is that directors may be inclined to approve a merger that gives
shareholders less than the best possible price, in consideration of extra benefits
flowing to the directors, such as consulting contracts, guarantees of employment, or golden parachutes.'65 Revlon's holding that, once the decision has
been made that the company is for sale, the role of the board changes to that
of auctioneer, seeking the highest price for the shareholders, does not preclude
a board from preferring a negotiated transaction at a price less than the
maximum possible price to shareholders because of some side benefit flowing
to them." To be sure, in this context, too, the appraisal right offers some
protection to the shareholders, although it is imperfect and costly to enforce.
In the case of hostile takeover bids, if a bid is successful, the shareholders
will get a price substantially above that available in the market.'6 7 In a

163. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.405 (Supp. 1993).

164. In that regard, the article by Professor Bainbridge is an exception, although
even he looks most extensively at the takeover context.
165. Bainbridge supra note 3, at 1010. See Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180
(N.Y. 1975) (after the boards of Talcott National Corp. and Gulf & Western had
agreed in principle on G&W's acquisition of Talcott, the Talcott board approved a
number of transactions made for the benefit of Talcott's inside directors and G&W,
but not Talcott or its shareholders).
166. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(1986); see also Barr,329 N.E.2d at 184, 188; Bainbridge, supranote 3, at 1010-11.
167. This was certainly true in the case of the hostile bids in the '80s, in which
premiums of 50% and more above market price were paid to shareholders, and
probably holds even in the area of negotiated mergers. When the merger is financed
with high-yield bonds, as noted above (see supranote 5), previously outstanding bonds
were often down-graded by the rating services, resulting in a substantial loss of capital
value to the holders of those bonds. This, then, resulted in a transfer of value from
the prior bondholders to the common stockholders. See generally McDaniel, supra
note 5, at 206-09; HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 408 n.4.
Employees' investment in the firm, as noted previously (supra note 116 and
accompanying text), is primarily in the form of "human capital"-skills they have
developed over the years that are largely specific to the particular firm, and may not
be as useful to other firms. Often, the employee is encouraged to develop these skills
in exchange for wage increases, but often the employee has not been compensated in
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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sense, then, shareholders may be arrogating to themselves part of the firmspecific capital investment of others; mainly employees, but possibly creditors
and others as well. 68 And, even in those cases in which management may
be tempted to recommend a transaction that is at too low a price, a fully
diversified shareholder is protected against this sort of firm-specific risk.'69
When we turn to the area of operational decisions, other constituency
statutes may represent a very fundamental change in corporate doctrine.
Traditionally, shareholders have had little or no direct input on these sorts of
decisions; they are the sorts of matters that are committed to directorial
discretion under the statutory directive that "the property and business of a
corporation shall be controlled and managed by a board of directors."'70
This gives the board virtually plenary power over the corporation. Under the
conventional formulation of the business judgment rule, when the board in
good faith, and in the absence of fraud, illegality, or self-dealing, exercises its
business judgment, a court will not look behind the judgment and impose
liability on the directors, even if the decision proves to have been erroneous.' 7 '

In exercising its business judgment, the board is expected to

consider the best interests of the corporation. This presumably includes the
best interests of the shareholders, but does it permit the board to consider the
impact on other constituencies? In a sense, extending the other constituency

statutes to all board exercises of business judgment may suggest a legislative
belief that a board could not consider the effect of a particular course of action
on other constituencies.77 Again, the permissive nature of the statutory

full for the higher skill level. In part, the employee has relied on the implicit promise
of certain benefits that may be endangered if the firm is taken over and the employee
discharged, or the pension fund used in part to finance the takeover. In that way, the
shareholders also expropriate some of the employees' human capital when the
aggressor reduces work forces and/or benefits in order to satisfy the indebtedness
incurred. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 11-12; O'Connor, supra note 110, at 905-17.
168. Coffee, supra note 2, at 11-12; Bainbridge supra note 3, at 1007-008. See
also Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CoRp. L. 205, 206-09
(1988).
169. Coffee, supra note 2, at 19.
170. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.310 (1986). Other statutory formulations vary, but
the effect is the same. See, e.g., MBCA § 35 ("[A]II corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation
shall be managed under the direction of, a board of directors"); RMBCA § 8.01(b)

(same).
171. CLARK, supra note 10, at 123, 124.
172. That is, the legislature must not have believed that the board could consider
the impact on other constituencies under common law approaches because if it had

believed such considerations to be already available there would be no need for the
statutory authorization.
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language is troubling: they may consider these other constituencies, but they
don't have to do so. Professor Bainbridge argues that these statutes do not
change the rules in these areas of operational decisions,' but that seems
unclear. Professor Bainbridge is correct, however, in his contention' 74 that
extra-judicial constraints eventually will limit managers' ability to serve their
own interests in these operational decisions. Once it becomes clear that
particular managers engage in that sort of behavior, either investors will
replace them, or investors will shift their investments from that firm into firms
that are more honestly managed. These same sorts of market constraints do
not operate in the takeover context, however, because those are "final period
problems": 7 1 if the transaction occurs, the firm ceases to exist, and those
managers will not have to interact with other groups any longer.
B. Managers
As Coffee 176 points out, managers are more vulnerable to loss in the
context of takeovers, because they are less capable of diversifying their
investments in the firm than are shareholders. A large part of managers'
investment is firm-specific "human capital"-the particular skills that are
required in that firm, but perhaps not transportable, such as the acceptance of
lower current compensation in reliance on an implicit promise of continued
employment and deferred benefits in retirement. 7 Further, compensation
plans using company securities, stock options, and other incentives increase
the concentration of managers' investments in the particular firm. Thus, when
shareholders receive premium prices in hostile takeovers, it is quite likely that
at least part of that premium represents a transfer of wealth from managers to
shareholders.7 7 Top managers have demonstrated their ability to negotiate

173.
174.
175.
176.

Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1001.
Id. at 1000-01.
Id. at 1001.
Coffee, supra note 2, at 17-19.

177. Thus, there is an "implicit" contract between the manager and the corporation

that is threatened in the takeover context. See id. at 23-24; Van Wezel Stone, supra
note 3, at 48-53.
178. Coffee, supra note 2, at 23-24; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 3 at 48-53.
This again is an illustration of the "implicit contract" theory: if the manager is
discharged following a successful takeover bid, he may never receive the implicitly
promised benefits. To that extent, wealth is transferred from the managers to
shareholders. Of course, to the extent that managers own shares in the target
corporation, they receive the same premium as the other shareholders, but it is unlikely
to be equivalent to the "promised" benefits.
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for protection79 from this type of danger through such means as "golden
parachutes."'

But, a hostile takeover bid presents the essential conflict of interest
situation for top management. They know that if a bid is successful, they
probably will be replaced. The "inside directors" have a pronounced conflict
of interest, which "taints" the judgment of the entire board, especially when
"inside" directors constitute a majority of the board.'
This justifies the
most intense judicial scrutiny of management's actions in response to a
takeover bid. And, because the business judgment rule typically does not
apply in the case of self-dealing, 8' it is difficult to see how the other
constituency statutes could be invoked here. It appears, though, that the
legislatures thought they could apply. Commentators' have argued that
hostile tender offers are the market's way of disciplining inept management,

179. A "golden parachute" is a contractual undertaking by the company that, in
the event of the occurrence of specified events (e.g., a hostile takeover), the manager
will receive a generous severance payment. In the RJR Nabisco takeover, Ross
Johnson, the former CEO of RJR, received a $50 million golden parachute. See
BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 1. In some cases, lower level employees have
received "tin parachutes"-similar contracts, at lower severance payment levels--but
this practice appears to be less widely used. See, e.g., Alison Leigh Cowan, New Ploy:
"Tin Parachutes," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1987, at D1. See also Patrick J. Ryan,
Corporate Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers-Reflections on the Tin
Parachute,64 TUL. L. REv. 3 (1989).
180. Mace, supra note 115, at 43, reported that, in practice, directors were most
often selected by top management, unless there was a significant shareholder group
that was able to gain representation on the board. And, "outside" directors-those
whose only affiliation with the corporation is service as a director-tend to be chosen
from the ranks of high executives of other corporations, people who are very similar
in background and outlook to the very managers they are supposed to be supervising.
Further, chief executive officers are unlikely to ask persons whom they expect to be
hostile to their (the CEO's) positions or actions. Thus, until relatively recently, one
would expect the actions of a board of directors to be strongly influenced by the
position of the inside directors. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
Again, outside directors have full-time commitments to their primary employer, their
own corporation; they cannot be expected to devote extensive amounts of time to their
service on a board, and they do not have access to the detailed information that inside
directors possess. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS
(1975); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971); RALPH NADER
ET. AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). Thus, the conduct of the director
defendants in Smith v. Van Gorkom may not have been as unusual as the chancery

court suggested.
181. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
182. Lucian A. Bebcheck, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers:
A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REv. 23, 28 (1982); Coffee, supra note 2, at 5.
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and insuring that assets are put to their highest and best use, and that therefore
management should be passive in response to tender offers. The difficulty is
that many of the takeover targets of the '80s were well-managed companies; because some of the companies resulting from these leveraged buyouts have had to be reorganized again and again 8 . successor management
may not have been all that disciplined or efficient.
When we turn to operational decisions, managers are making those
decisions now; it is difficult to see how managers as a group are affected.
Presumably, they take their own interests into account in making those
decisions. For them, the other constituency statutes offer a justification for
whatever decision they want to make.'85
C. Other Employees
Ordinary employees may lose jobs when companies are taken over, or
when companies restructure drastically in order to avoid a takeover.' 6
However, that is by no means certain: even when a successful takeover

183. See, e.g., Edward S. Herman & Louis Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of
Hostile Takeovers, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS 217-220, 230-233 (John C. Coffee et. al., eds., 1988), reprinted in
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 974-79.
184. See, e.g., George Anders, Playtex Goes Through FourBuy-outs Since 1985,
EnrichingTop Officers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1991, at Al (reporting that Playtex, Inc.
had gone through four buy-outs since 1991); Deals and Misdeals: A Sampling of
M&A Hits and Strikeouts in the 1980s, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Mar./Apr. 1990,

at 100, 102-03 (listing 9 failed LBO's as ofthat time). More recently, George Anders,
More 1980's LBOs Rush To Go Public, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1992, at Cl, reported

a number of former LBO companies that were taking advantage of a "bull" market for
new issues to go public again. Apparently, Playtex is trying to get in on this action,
too. See Playtex FPPlanninglPO To Raise $243.3 Million, WALL ST. J., November
11, 1993, at B6; Ann Newman Playtex's IPO Will Value the Holdings of Current
Owners at Over $100 Million, WALL ST. J., December 2, 1993, at Cl.

185. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
186. See O'Connor, supra note 110, at 915-17; Bainbridge, supranote 3, at 1003-

004 nn.136-40.
But see DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND

REORGANIZATIONS 8 (1991), stating that, among 62 targets of hostile takeovers

between 1984 and 1986, the total post takeover layoffs were about 26,000 people, or
about 2.5% of the labor force of an average target firm. "These layoffs are noticeable
for the target firm, but small in the context of the national economy. By comparison,
General Electric cut its work force by over 100,000 between 1981 and 1987." Further,
the article noted, post takeover layoffs disproportionately affect relatively high-level
white collar employees, as hostile takeovers lead to reduction of headquarters
employment. Id.
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restructures the target corporation, it does not necessarily mean that the
operating elements will be withdrawn from production. Often, they .will
merely shift ownership and continue operations, although they may streamline
their employment rosters to some extent in the process. Furthermore,
employees are threatened quite as much by routine "operational" decisions
such as closing a plant in the United States and moving production into a
lower-cost developing country." 7 These sorts of decisions have traditionally
lain within the province of the business judgment rule.
Those employees covered by collective bargaining agreements may be
able to negotiate for job security in the form of plant closing provisions in
labor negotiations. Employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements, and not sufficiently high in the corporate structure to be able to obtain
"golden" or even "tin" parachutes, may not be able to protect themselves by
express contracts, and the "implicit" contract suggested elsewhere' may be
of little help, or comfort. These employees also have made extensive firmspecific investments of human capital, in terms of specific skills that are more
or less uniquely suited to a particular firm, which are jeopardized by these
sorts of decisions. Additional dangers lie in adverse changes in retirement
plans; these may be regulated to some degree by ERISA, 8 9 but the regulation is less than perfect.'
These sorts of matters have traditionally been relegated to the business
judgment rule. The other constituency statute permits the board to consider
these impacts in making its decisions, but provides scant guidance as to how
to weight them, and does not require such consideration. They provide scant
protection for those who most need them. It would be better to protect
employees directly, through plant closing laws and other worker protection
9
statutes.1 '
D. Creditors

187. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. See also OESTERLE, supra
note 187, at 243-59.

188. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
189. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified as
amendedat 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (Supp. III 1991). See generally BRUCE ALLAN
MILLER, EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs: MERGERS AND AcQuIsITIoNs (1985).
190. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1003 n.138 (citing examples of the use
of pension funds to finance leveraged buy-outs).

191. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1012 & n.165. Bainbridge cites Marleen A.
O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
FiduciaryDutyto Protect,60 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1233 (1991), for the proposition that
many of the managers who vigorously lobbied state legislatures for nonshareholder
constituency statutes were equally vigorous in opposing these worker protection laws.
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As already noted, courts have generally held that directors do not owe
fiduciary duties to creditors." 9 Rather, creditors are relegated to whatever
remedies they have provided in their contracts. Long-term creditors have
protected themselves through contractual arrangements, such as requiring
specific levels of reserves, periodic amortization of the debt, requiring
specified levels of shareholders' equity, or accelerating the full amount of the
debt upon a sale of all or substantially all the borrower's assets. 93
In spite of these protections, many long-term creditors were caught off
guard by the leveraged buy-out ["LBO"] phenomenon of the 1980s. Even
though much of the debt issued to accomplish these transactions was
subordinated to existing long-term debt, the degree of leverage in many firms
became so high as to materially increase the risk of default on all the debt,
thus leading to a decline in the value of the existing debt. 94 In this way,
at least some of the early LBOs probably did transfer wealth from existing
creditors to shareholders. Toward the latter part of the wave of buy-outs,
creditors began to guard against such transfers by strengthening the protections
in their loan agreements, restricting overall debt levels, and accelerating the
debt if leverage exceeded specified levels."
Ordinary trade creditors may not be able to protect themselves contractually because they lack the bargaining power to obtain protective provisions.
One selling expendable supplies to a manufacturing concern is very well aware
that, should he seek to include protective provisions in the contract of sale, his
customer will laugh in his face and buy from his competitor, unless his
commodity is somehow unique. Vigilance is the trade creditor's protection:"' monitor the debtor closely, and when danger signs appear, act
immediately. Keeping open accounts fairly current is not absolute protection,
but should limit the loss.
So, ordinary trade creditors are one of the prime candidates for protection
by a nonshareholder constituency statute; long-term creditors can protect
themselves'generally by appropriate contractual provisions, provided courts
192. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. See also Tauke, supranote 159,
at 53-67, 131-32 (defending the traditional contractual approach to bondholders'
rights).
193. Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom, 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953); KLEIN &
COFFEE, supra note 91, at 240-53; BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, LEGAL
CAPITAL 103-05 (3d ed. 1990).
194. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); HAMILTON, supranote 5, at 408-09 n.4 (discussing the downgrading
of RJR Nabisco's pre-existing debt from investment grade ("A") to "junk" bonds
("Caa") as a result of the additional debt financing used to complete the merger).
195. See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 409-10 n.6; Coffee, supra note 106, at
1519-20.
196. See, e.g., MANNING & HANKS, supra note 193, at 98-101.
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will compel borrowers to honor their contractual commitments.' 97 Unfortunately, the legislatures have not seen fit to provide any guidance for courts as
to how to protect these groups in the wide variety of circumstances under
which boards of directors exercise business judgment, and courts do not seem
well equipped to develop such guidelines on their own. Nor do any
specialized agencies seem better equipped.
E. Suppliers and Customers
Logically, many suppliers will fall into the category of ordinary trade
creditors, which were just considered. Here, however, we are concerned
primarily with those suppliers and customers whose claim to protection derives
from their unique ties to a particular corporation. In the case of suppliers, it
may be because they have been induced to make substantial investments that
are suited only to the particular corporation's operations. In a sense, they
have a "firm-specific" investment in the corporation, not too different from
that of employees and managers.' 3 Customers may also have unique claims
to protection because of heavy dependence on the corporation's product,
making them vulnerable to the risk of opportunistic behavior by the particular
corporation. Once again, these highly vulnerable individuals or firms can seek
to protect themselves contractually, but may lack the bargaining power to
succeed.
Other suppliers and customers-those who have other potential customers
or sources of product, and so are not uniquely tied to the particular corporation-are less subject to opportunistic behavior, and thus have lower claims
to protection. Their protection is to take their business elsewhere, provided
only that there are functioning competitive markets to which they can turn.
But, even those firms that are uniquely dependent on a particular
corporation inevitably face the risk that the corporation may fail, and they may
lose their customer or their source of supply. Surely, the other constituency
statute cannot reasonably mean that, should a board's exercise of business
judgment be erroneous, so that the corporation fails, these uniquely dependent
197. Remember, the court did not compel RJR to honor its implicit commitments
not to change the risk to existing creditors by taking on huge amounts of subordinated
debt. See RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. at 1518-25.

198. That is, a corporation has chosen to organize its production across markets,
by contract, rather than organizing within the firm, as by undertaking to manufacturing
the supplies within the firm. If the firm had chosen to organize within the firm, then
the fiduciary obligations of the managers would run, in part, to the "supplier" element
within the firm. Should the decision to organize across markets, contractually, lead
to legal differences in regard to managers' fiduciary obligations? If the answer to the
question is "no," then other constituency statutes should be interpreted to require
managers to consider those constituencies.
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suppliers and customers have a claim against directors for not adequately
considering the effect of the transaction on them. Recall the hypothetical
situation of ABC Corp. considering a move of its manufacturing facility to the
maquiladora zone of Mexico, in order to reduce labor and environmental
protection costs.'
It was noted above that U.S. workers would be
damaged, whereas workers in Mexico would benefit; the impact on suppliers
and customers is less certain. Suppliers of unique inputs may continue to sell
to ABC, albeit at a slightly higher price because of transportation costs, or the
supplier may lose out to other suppliers closer to the new location. Customers
may in fact benefit, because ABC's lower production costs may permit ABC
to sell the product more cheaply, in spite of higher transportation costs. (Of
course, ABC could continue to charge the same price and reap a fatter profit
margin-at least until another producer of ABC's product emerged to
compete.) How is a court to evaluate the directors' decision to move, or not
to move, under these circumstances? Under traditional analyses, the court
would apply the business judgment rule, and exonerate the directors. The
addition of other constituencies expands the protection of the business
judgment rule, rendering the directors' decision virtually impregnable to
challenge.
Again, the legitimate claim these groups have is for protection against
opportunistic behavior by the corporation. The ambiguous other constituency
statutes, as presently constituted, do not provide a basis to do that.
F. Communities
Here, "communities" is used in a generic sense, to include not just local
cities and towns, but other levels-county, regional, state, or national-which
may have interests affected by corporate action. The claim for protection here
arises because the community (often, the immediate locality, but sometimes
a broader region as well) may have made substantial investments in infrastructure-schools, roads, sewers and other public utilities, not to mention tax
relief-in consideration for getting a major corporate facility to locate or
remain within its boundaries. All of these investments, of course, are
jeopardized if that facility relocates, whether because of a corporate combination or some other business decision (e.g., ABC moves to Mexico).
Again, a community could bargain for contractual protections before
undertaking such substantial investments, but as a practical matter that has
been unlikely to occur because there was just too much competition for new
industries.2"' Recently, a few states2"' have enacted laws requiring compa-

199. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
200. But see Hayes, supra note 4, at B6, reporting that many communities are
demanding long-term commitments in return for tax abatements, low interest loans,
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nies to compensate municipalities for financial inducements if they move out
of town prematurely. In 1991, General Motors entered into a ten year contract
with the town of Arlington, Texas, under which the town can seek to recover
all the abated taxes if GM closed its plant within 5 years." 2
To some degree, communities may be protected by corporate inertia.
When a corporation has a substantial investment in a locale, and many of its
personnel have developed attachments to the area, there may be a tendency to
remain unless there is a compelling reason for change. A threatened takeover,
or financial reversals, could provide such compelling reasons.
The major point, however, is that other constituency provisions are, at
best, an indirect effort to provide some protection to these interests. Indeed,
they may be more harmful than helpful, for they may lull community leaders
into complacency, thinking that more protection is afforded than in fact exists.
If these concerns are legitimate, and they seem to be, it is far better to address
them directly, as a few states have begun to do."° 3
VIII. CONTEXTS
As noted above,2" the original Missouri provision applied only in the
takeover context; it has subsequently been modified so that, like many of the
other statutes, it applies to any exercise of business judgment. The question
then arises, in what contexts should other constituencies be considered? And,
how does the context affect that consideration?
A. Hostile Takeovers

and other financial inducements.

The article goes on to note that states and

communities are going to court also, reporting that New York state's commissioner of

economic development was considering suing General Motors, which had announced
plans to close a plant at North Tarrytown, NY, which would idle 3,400 workers. The
town had granted GM tax abatements when it threatened to close the plant in 1980.
The article also referred to a ruling by a trial judge in Michigan that blocked GM's
plans to close a plant in Ypsilanti, MI, because, the court held, "GM had made an
implied promise to stay put when it accepted Ypsilanti's inducement of $13 million
in tax abatements in 1984 and 1988." A similar claim was rejected in an action
brought by the town of Norwood, Ohio, over a plant closing in 1987, however. Alas,
the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in the Ypsilanti case. See
Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
201. Sed LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1927 (West Supp. 1994); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 122.17 (Anderson 1992).
202. Hayes, supra note 4, at B6.
203. See supra note 202.
204. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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Certainly, a hostile takeover is drastic, so far as management is
concerned, and for shareholders, who presumably receive a premium price for
their shares. As to other possible constituencies, it is difficult to say, a priori,

whether any particular takeover is good or bad. Even in the extreme case of
a "bust-up" takeover, in which the successful acquiror sells off portions of the
acquired company in order to repay part of the debt used to finance the
acquisition, the assets sold are not necessarily removed from production.
Rather, they are often sold to another group that expects to be able to manage
the assets more efficiently. It is difficult to see how other constituencies, or
society in general, are injured by such an eventuality.
Often, in an effort to reduce costs and to help reduce indebtedness, new
management will reduce the labor force, to the detriment of current employees." 5 But, should the law compel managers to retain unneeded employees?
It is possible that inefficient prior management had allowed the corporation to
get "fat," either to enhance their own prestige and "perks," or for other
reasons.
Again, as noted, 0 ' organized employees can bargain for
protections in this area, although more direct statutory protection, in the form
of plant closing legislation, is probably more efficient. Mid-level employees,
who often are not organized, may not be able to protect themselves contractually; they are the group most likely to lose out on firm-specific human capital.
Top managers have demonstrated their ability to protect themselves through
golden parachutes.
In addition, regardless of what directors do or do not do, many natural
events in the course of a business cycle can compel a corporation to seek to
reduce labor charges by shrinking the employee base. Certainly courts would
not compel directors to retain a bloated staff in periods of financial exigency.
Should hostile takeovers be treated differently?
In the context of a hostile takeover, the bidder must believe the target is
worth more than its current market valuation, and so is willing to pay some
premium in order to acquire control. In the context of directors' responses to

such offers, the central issue often becomes how that premium will be divided

between shareholders and managers, after making due allowance for the

contractual rights of creditors. 0 7 If the law introduces the interests of other
constituencies into that calculus, it becomes enormously more complicated,
while offering minimal, if any, offsetting benefits." 8 Indeed, whatever
change is introduced is most likely to be pernicious, in that it vastly broadens
the discretion granted management.2"

205. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
207. Coffee, supra note 2, at 9, 66-71.
208. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 116, at 417-19.
209. Id.
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B. FundamentalChanges
One of the traditional areas of shareholder involvement is approval of
fundamental changes: amendment of the articles of incorporation, approval
of business combinations (in any of their myriad forms), and voluntary
dissolution. Most also involve the board of directors, who generally formulate
a proposal which is then referred to the shareholders for approval. 1 ° In
each case, the shareholders will be involved, in that they must vote; in the
business combinations area, a dissenting shareholder can also seek an appraisal

of the value of his shares, and payment of that value upon surrender of the

shares. If other constituencies are to be considered, it presumably will occur
in the board's decision to propose the change. No one has yet proposed
anything comparable to the dissenting shareholders' rights for other constituencies.
An amendment to the articles of incorporation represents a basic change
in the relationships between and among the corporation, the state, and the
shareholders (and among the shareholders interse). If an amendment poses
dangers to other constituencies, as some antitakeover amendments might, the
logical agency to intervene and take corrective action would appear to be the
state, rather than the directors who have been chosen by the shareholders
alone. The state could impose procedural requirements for amendments"'
or could limit the kinds of amendments that might be tolerated." And,
some constituencies can protect themselves contractually, as noted above." 3
Involving these constituencies directly in the amendment process would
represent a very fundamental shift in our perception of the corporation.

210. In this respect, the Missouri statute is somewhat more flexible than many
statutes, in that it permits proposals for many of these transactions to be submitted
directly to shareholders without being filtered through the board. Compare, e.g., Mo.
REV. STAT. § 351.090.2(1) (Supp. 1993) (amendment of articles may be submitted
directly to shareholders) with MBCA § 59 (requiring board to propose amendment and
submit to shareholders). As a practical matter, in a corporation of any size, the
shareholders are usually too diverse a group to be able to organize effectively to bring
a proposal for a fundamental change before a meeting of shareholders, so that the
board will almost always be involved. Of course, if there is a shareholder with a
substantial percentage of the shares (as in the case of a partially successful tender
offeror), that shareholder may have the means and desire to by-pass the board. On the
other hand, often such an influential shareholder may well control the board and be
able to get whatever she wants.
211. E.g., by requiring approval of affected constituencies.
212. The latter seems highly unlikely; it is difficult to envision the types of
restrictions that might be imposed, and any effort to be exhaustive in enumerating
restrictions would be so cumbersome as to be outright ludicrous.
213. See supra notes 187-204 and accompanying text.
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Business combinations-here, friendly, negotiated transactions, because
hostile takeovers have already been addressed-will occur only if both sides
consider the combination advantageous. At least, the managements involved
will have to agree; there are mechanisms (e.g., triangular mergers214) by
which some of the affected shareholders can be by-passed, but even if their
vote can be avoided, they will retain the dissenters' rights to appraisal. The
directors' fiduciary obligations also provide some protection. Creditors and
organized employees can seek contractual protections, again. But, as to other
constituencies-communities, unorganized employees, trade creditors-they
may be either helped or hurt, but it is impossible to determine, in the abstract,
which it will be. Again, trying to include all these groups in the determination
of particular combinations is likely to render the process so rigid as to
preclude all combinations.
Finally, voluntary dissolution is an extreme measure, unlikely to be
undertaken except in the most unusual circumstances. There may be situations
in which unscrupulous managers and shareholders can seize such an
opportunity to appropriate assets and values properly belonging to one or more
of the other constituencies, but they are hard to visualize." 5 Indeed, the
statutory procedures governing the winding up of a corporation's business2" 6
are intended to protect most external parties. If dissolution is indeed in the
best interests of the corporation, the standard for board action, it is difficult
to conceive that a court would block the action in the interests of one of the
other groups. Also, it is important to recall that dissolution does not
necessarily mean that the assets will be withdrawn from produdtion; often,
they will merely change hands, to be operated by new managers.

214. To accomplish a triangular merger, the would-be acquiring corporation ("A
Corp") creates a wholly-owned subsidiary, Asub, and places A shares in Asub. It then
proposes to the target corporation ("T Co") that T Co merge into Asub in exchange for
the A Corp shares held by Asub. The end result is that T Co becomes a wholly-owned

subsidiary of A Corp, but the A Corp shareholders never got to vote on the proposal.
(Of course, the T Co shareholders would have to vote.) Caveat: if the number of
shares to be issued by A Corp exceeds by 20% the number previously available for
trading, and A Corp shares are listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange,
Exchange rules may require that A Corp shareholders be allowed to vote, but most
state corporation statutes do not.
215. There are many cases, of course, in which managers or controlling
shareholders have attempted to secure advantages denied to minority shareholders.
See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass.
1975); Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So.2d 1328 (Miss. 1979). These are situations in

which courts are beginning to find fiduciary duties owed by shareholders to one
another, as well as the duties owed by directors and officers.
216. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.462 -.484 (Supp. 1993).
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IX. LIMIT DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES?

One possible explanation for the adoption of other constituency statutes
is that they are intended to limit directors' exposure to liability, by providing
additional defenses directors can raise. But, while there has been a fair
amount of anecdotal evidence about the difficulties getting and keeping good
directors because of the fear of ruinous liability,2" 7 there is little valid
empirical evidence of it."1 8 If, indeed, premiums for directors' and officers'
liability insurance premiums have increased,2" 9 how much of the increase
was due to higher litigation costs, and how much to anticompetitive practices
in the insurance industry?'2

The litigation costs, both direct and indirect, associated with holding

directors to a minimal standard of behavior do not contribute, directly,221 to
produce goods and services useful to society: they are a net loss to society,
except insofar as the recipients of fees, are able to live at a higher standard of
living. But, the defensive costs of creating "paper trails" to demonstrate a

proper level of directorial behavior are totally unproductive, along with the
judicial time and resources consumed by these cases, which are necessarily
"big" cases; if the plaintiffs can get past the routine motions to dismiss, they
can go on for years. And, of course, the plaintiffs' costs, such as attorney's
fees and discovery expenses, are not insubstantial. But, all these costs would
be justified if the litigation did indeed lead directors-both those sued, and
others who learn of the litigation-to behave with more circumspection in the
future. Alas, it seems far more likely that directors are prompted to beseech
their state legislatures for statutes limiting the amount for which they can be
held liable,' - all the while erecting facades to demonstrate how diligently

217. See, e.g., William B. Glaberson & William J. Powell, A Landmark Ruling
that Puts Board Members in Peril,Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1985, at 57.
218. See, e.g., SODERQUIST & SOMMER, supra note 17, at 206 & nn.17-19.
219. See supra note 19.
220. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1988), the business
of insurance is not subject to the restrictions of the federal antitrust laws.
221. To be sure, to the extent that such litigation induces directors to manage the
companies better, they do contribute to enhanced production. Such contributions are
very indirect, however, and uncertain in amount. Again, is this game worth the
candle?
222. Thirty-six states have enacted statutes which limit or authorize corporations
to limit liability of directors. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.050(a) (Supp. 1993); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-054.9 (1990); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1005.18 (1990); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-27-202 (Michie 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(2)(a) (1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-290(c)(2) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (Harrison 1990); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 415-48.5(a) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1993); IOWA
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they've performed. The other constituency statutes, by expressly countenancing directors' considerations of a host of other factors in the exercise of their
business judgment, probably ease the directors' minds, whether or not they
have any effect.

A. Purposesfor Imposing Liability
Once again, neither courts, legislatures, nor commentators have clearly
stated a rationale for imposing liability on directors.' The usual reason for
a damage award is to compensate the parties injured by someone's breach of
a duty.224 But, considering the massive damages imposed in recent
cases,2Z even a very wealthy board of directors would be unable to satisfy
them. Insurance is the only feasible vehicle for generating such sums. 6
Even these massive recoveries would result in recoveries of a few cents or a
dollar or so per share to the shareholders of large corporations-slight
incentive to bring the action, which would be further reduced by allowing
other constituencies to share in the recovery.

§ 490.832 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(b), (5)(d) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:24(C)(4) (West Supp. 1994); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2
(1993); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1 1/2) (West 1992); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 450.1209(c) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.64 Subd. 4 (West
Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-2.02.(b)(4) (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-216(2)(d) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037.1 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 292:2.V-a.(a) (Supp. 1993); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7 (West Supp. 1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-7-28 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50.5 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1006.B.6 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(d) (1993);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-48(6) (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102 (Law. Co-op.
1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 47-2-58.8 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-12-102(b)(3) (Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(3)(B)
(West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-841(1) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1993); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.0828 (West 1992); WYo. STAT.
§ 17-16-834(a) (1989).
223. Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980), a securities law
case, comes as close as any to identifying a rationale for damage calculations under
Rule 10b-5; unfortunately, there isn't a counterpart to Elkind in the state law area.
224. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 210 & n.17, 216-20 (2d ed.
1993).
225. E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) ($23.5 million). See
supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
226. Of course, as noted supranote 17, insurance only paid part of the settlement
in Smith v. Van Gorkom.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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Another rationale for imposing liability on directors is to induce a desired
minimum level of performance. Although this explanation is more appealing
than that just discussed, it does not seem to require imposition of massive,
ruinous damages. This goal could be reached, even for affluent directors, by
imposing a significant, but not disastrous, amount for which directors could
be held personally liable." 7 One objection to this approach is that it may
lead the director into a perverse cost-benefit analysis: if I goof off as a
director, andget caught (and, what is the probability of getting caught?), I can
be liable for up to $X; is my freedom to goof off worth that much to me?228
And, perhaps more realistically, if the limit is set too low, it may remove any
incentive for the shareholders, as "private attorneys general," to bring actions
against miscreant directors.
All states permit corporations to indemnify directors against liabilities to
which they are exposed because of serving on a board of directors. 9
Permitting corporations to indemnify directors, or purchase D&O insurance
policies for them, may reduce directors' incentives to perform at acceptable
levels of behavior." One approach might be to set some lower limit to the

227. Indeed, many would argue that it is the possibility of being sued, even more
than the exposure to damages, that bears on the sorts of people invited to serve on
boards of directors. They view themselves as community leaders, and worry that being
a named defendant is a blot on their reputations, even if they are ultimately exonerated.
228. Admittedly, this is a far-fetched hypothetical; it is doubtful that the sorts of
people serving on boards of directors would be inclined to engage in this sort of
calculus. Still, the possibility exists.
229. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1991); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.355
(1986); MBCA § 5.
230. Cf Item 510 of SEC Regulation S-K, requiring that a prospectus for a
securities offering include a description of any indemnification provisions relating to
directors, officers, and controlling persons of the registrant, and requiring that the
following statement be included:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities
Act of 1933 may be permitted to directors, officers or persons controlling
the registrant pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the registrant has been
informed that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission
such indemnification is against public policy as expressed in the Act and is
therefore unenforceable.
17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (1993).
This Item reflects the SEC's historic antipathy for indemnification provisions,
based on their concern that it will decrease the directors' incentive to ensure accuracy
of statements made in a registration statement. The SEC also, as a condition to
"acceleration" of the effective date of the registration statement, a practical recessity
in almost all public offerings, requires the issuer of the securities to enter into an
undertaking, if there should be a claim for indemnification, to submit the question to
a court of competent jurisdiction.
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amount that may be indemnified-e.g., no indemnification for liabilities up to,
say, $500,00023'-but insurance can be carried for liabilities exceeding that
amount.
B. What sorts of liabilities?
The principal obligations imposed on directors are a duty of care and a
duty of loyalty. Most of the statutes permitting corporations to limit directors'
liability permit limitations on liability for breach of the duty of care, but not
for loyalty. 2 That division is probably appropriate, if corporations should
be permitted to impose such limits at all.
Directors are required to act with the degree of care of a reasonable
person in a like position under similar circumstances because of the need for
them to exercise some minimal degree of care. At the same time, directors
should feel free to take risks without undue fear of personal liability, because
the shareholders, as the residual claimants, benefit the most from those risky
ventures that pay off. 3 Professor Coffee 4 points out that there is a
tendency for shareholders to be more risk-tolerant than managers, in part
because managers' investment is more firm-specific; properly diversified
investors are more willing to accept risks than are managers, whose human
and financial capital may be wiped out if the risk does not pan out. As a
result, a variety of compensation mechanisms have been devised to attempt to
align managers' risk preferences more closely to those of shareholders."S
Clearly, liability rules that are too strict undercut the effort to bring managers'
risk preferences in line with those of shareholders. Perhaps the approach
taken in Francisv. United JerseyBank 6 is an appropriate standard: require
directors to keep themselves informed, oversee managers closely, and
challenge transactions that appear questionable. Failure to meet that standard
should be punishable, but at a reasonable level. 7

231. The number is,of course, arbitrary; it sounds like a lot to some, but probably
not to Ross Perot. Perhaps a sliding scale, in relation to the individual's net worth,
could be used. In any case, the minimum amount should be sufficient to get the
director's attention, but not be ruinous.
232. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
233. See generally KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 255-70.
234. Coffee, supra note 2, at 17-19.
235. Id. at 23-24; CLARK, supra note 10, § 6.2.1, at 201.
236. 392 A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), affd, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J.

1981).
237. Id. at 1242. To be sure, in Francis, full liability was imposed on the
director's estate, without limitation; but the likely beneficiaries of that estate were the
director's sons, who were the primary miscreants in a plan of fraud on business
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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The duty of loyalty usually refers to conflict of interest situations."8
As such, it is not appropriate to limit a director's liability for self-dealing,
usurpation of corporate opportunities, or other breaches of the duty of loyalty.
Indeed, those statutes that permit limitations on liability expressly exclude
breaches of the duty of loyalty. 9 Also, most of the existing indemnification statutes also bar or limit indemnification in these types of situations.24

C. How to limit?
A statutory limitation on directors' liability would be too inflexible to
cover the myriad situations arising in corporate America. A figure that would
deter an average individual might not dent the consciousness of a very wealthy
person. Also, any formula approach runs the risk of attaining complexity akin
to the Internal Revenue Code. Further, the contractarians24 would argue
that, in a particular corporation, the shareholders might be willing to impose
a limit on director's liability in order to secure the services of particular
individuals, or for other reasons. Perhaps an individual would be willing to
serve for less, or no, compensation if she were allowed to engage in selfdealing; if shareholders are willing to accept this, perhaps they should be free
to do so. Thus, the Delaware approach, of permitting a corporation to adopt

a provision in its articles of incorporation imposing such a limit might be
acceptable.

One risk inherent in this suggestion is that a Machiavellian promoter
might organize a corporation, and include a limitation provision in the initial
articles of incorporation, in order to avoid later having to submit an amendment adopting a limit to a shareholder vote. That could be overcome by
requiring, in the state corporation act, that these sorts of limitation provisions
be re-adopted periodically by shareholders, perhaps every five years or so.
X. CONCLUSIONS
Given that other constituency statutes are so riddled with uncertainty as
to be of little practical effect, why has there been so much pressure to adopt
them? Surely the lawyers who drafted them are far too intelligent to believe
they would in fact insulate their director clients from liability.242 Indeed, all

relations.
238. CLARK, supra note 10, § 4.1, at 141; KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at
163-69.
239. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
240. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.

241. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
242. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1002 n.133 (saying that this was almost
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they could realistically have hoped for is an additional argument that directors
could raise, if they were sued over some exercise of business judgment. In
this area, as in many others,243 it is in defendants' interests to delay, and
disputes over effects on other constituencies can certainly extend litigation,
even if they do not persuade a court to dismiss an action on preliminary
motion.2" The statutes thus have the potential to erect additional barriers
to shareholders' ability to hold directors accountable for what they do or do
not do.245
If the concern for excessive liability being imposed on directors is
legitimate, the other constituency statutes are, at best, an imperfect, indirect
reaction. It would be much better to provide limitations on liability directly,
through legislation targeted at those areas in which limitations may be
appropriate. Rather than adopt statutory limitations, applicable to all
corporations, it would seem better to permit corporations to elect to adopt
limits on their own directors' liability, and such limitations should be subject

certainly the intent of the drafters, but at least some of the legislators had real concern
for nonshareholder constituencies). Bainbridge cites back to his footnote 115, at 996,
in which he quotes exchanges with some of the proponents of the Pennsylvania
version, and cites to Charles J. Dangelo, Comment, Community Effects as a Factorin
CorporateDecisionsUnderPennsylvania'sNewBusiness CorporationLaw: Objective
Evidence of a Subjective Process,28 DUQ. L. REv. 533, 536 (1990), for the notion
that the legislation was intended to benefit shareholders as well as other constituencies,
not to protect corporate management. At best, this reflects.the thinking of those
particular legislators; it says nothing at all about what the collective intent of the
legislature as a whole may have been. Indeed, particularly in the area of state
legislation, the term "legislative intent" is an oxymoron.
243. For example, in the antitrust field, it has been noted that, notwithstanding the
possibility of treble damages, it could be financially worthwhile to fix prices even if
one were caught. The use of the extra profits derived from the price fixing throughout
the duration of the litigation, coupled with the courts' typical aversion to allowing
interest to run on damages until the judgment has been entered, means that the
defendant in fact profits, even if he later does have to pay treble damages. See Walter
B. Erickson, The Profitabilityof Violating the Antitrust Laws: Dissolution and Treble
Damagesin PrivateAntitrust Litigation, 5 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 101 (1972).
244. As the law governing shareholder derivative actions is evolving, with the rise
of special litigation committees and the developments in the demand requirement (see
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, which has been the model for many state
counterparts)-especially in Delaware and New York (compareBarr v. Wackman, 329
N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1975) with Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984))-the deck
is fairly well stacked in directors' favor without more.
245. Again, the growing strength of advocacy organizations like United
Shareholders Association, coupled with the increased activism of at least some
institutional investors, is tending to counteract this trend to some extent. See supra
125-27 and accompanying text. However, this activity may be too little, too late.
notes
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to shareholder approval. Ideally, they should be subject to periodic
reapproval, perhaps every five years. If the opposite approach, of specifying
a statutory limitation, is chosen, then shareholders should be able to "opt out"
of the limits, although in view of the difficulty in organizing a diverse,
disparate, scattered group of shareholders, that is far less desirable than using
an "opt in" approach, with periodic reapproval.
Concurrently, it would be desirable to spell out standards of director
behavior, rather along the lines of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act 246 rather than leave these standards to the current case-by-case
determination. The judicial approach might be satisfactory in a jurisdiction,
like Delaware or New York, with a well developed body of case law, but in
jurisdictions like Missouri with limited judicial interpretations, there is too
much uncertainty. It becomes extremely difficult to advise clients with a high
degree of confidence as to how to conduct themselves, and how to ensure that
they will be protected against liability.
Of course, it is fruitless for a jurisdiction that wants to protect shareholders from managerial overreaching to have rules, either statutory or judicial,
that are much more stringent than those of the most liberal jurisdiction. Under
current interpretations, managers will simply incorporate in the more liberal
jurisdiction, and do business in their "home" state as foreign corporations.247
Additionally, corporate lobbyists are heard much more clearly in state capitals

than in Washington; legislators anxious to attract industry to the state, in order
to help fill the treasury's coffers, are unlikely to be too hard on corporations,
lest they discourage someone from locating in the state, or lead a domestic
corporation to flee to more friendly climes. It is the "race to the bottom" all
over.248 This again raises an argument for federal incorporation, at least of
larger corporations, but that idea has already been rejected many times.249
Other constituency statutes are so filled with uncertainties and inconsistencies that they should be repealed. Alternatively, courts should recognize
that the total elimination of any accountability of managers so conflicts with

246. E.g., RMBCA § 8.30.
247. E.g., most of the large, publicly held corporations headquartered in
Missouri-Anheuser-Busch, McDonnell-Douglas, and Monsanto-are incorporated
elsewhere. The holding company controlling Anheuser-Busch is a Delaware
corporation, although there is a domestic Anheuser-Busch Company; McDonnellDouglas is a Maryland corporation; Monsanto is a Delaware corporation. See the PHMOCORP database on Westlaw.
248. See the historical sketch in KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 114-19.
Under Commerce Clause interpretations, it is the law of the state of incorporation that
determines the corporation's internal operations. Id. at 116 n.7.
249. But see Karmel, supranote 1, at 91-96. However, it must be acknowledged
that Congressional personnel may not be immune from the blandishments of lobbyists
either.
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traditional notions of corporate governance that they should be voided. This
could be done if courts would apply Professor Macey's analysis, and interpret
the statutes in a public-regarding manner.2 10 But, for the reasons mentioned
in the paragraph just above, neither eventuality is likely to occur anytime
soon. Perhaps the best hope is that the newly-active institutional shareholders
and shareholders' advocacy groups can bring sufficient pressure to bear on
managers to get a significant proportion of corporations to "opt out" of these
sorts of statutes."'

250. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
251. See Minow, supra note 26, at 220, in which the author notes that, by
October 17, 1990-within months of the passage of the restrictive 1990 amendments
to the Pennsylvania other constituency statute-nearly a third of Pennsylvania's
publicly traded companies had opted out of at least portions of the statute. The author
goes on to say that 61% of the Fortune 500 companies incorporated in Pennsylvania
had opted out, as had over 56% of those included in the Standard & Poor 500.
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